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DETERMINACY AND DELIBERATION: AN INQUIRY
CONCERNING FORENSIC EPISTEMOLOGY
RAY CHAZO, ESQ.*
"I preach there are all kinds of truth, your truth and somebody
else's, but behind all of them, there's only one truth and that is
that there's no truth," he called. "No truth behind all truths is
what I and this church preach! Where you -come from is gone,
where you thought you were going to never was there, and where
you are is no good unless you can get away from it. Where is there
a place for you to be? No place."
-FLANNERY O'CONNOR'
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay is an attempt to elucidate a mystery that is jealously
guarded in the statements of jurisprudes and practical enforcers of
procedural norms. The process of deliberation, of arriving at a ra-
tionally defensible conclusion of fact, is centrally located in a body
of doctrine that insists upon uniformity, regularity, and sound
method. Yet the deliberation process, if that is what it is, must be
conducted in secret. The jury room is sacrosanct; and findings of
fact are overturned only if the factfinder is lying or is demonstrably
insane.
The strongest and the oldest bulwarks of doctrine are built upon
the distinction between "fact" and "law," and they are built pri-
marily to keep the act of deliberation at a level of unfathomable
subjectivity. Why? Because no alternative procedure is consistent
with our cherished political values. Separate instances of fact never
compel determinate conclusions in law, in science, or in art. Truth
is usually stranger than fiction because of the particulars of de-
meanor and self-interest, the life-experiences of the factfinders, the
interaction between experience and perception, and between mem-
ory and articulation. The combination of these factors gives fact-
finding a psychological complexity beyond the comprehension of
normative speech. In contrast, when "law" instead of "fact" is in
issue, great jurists spin metaphors to extraordinary lengths, seeking
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to communicate the ineffable elements of practical wisdom which
will exhibit creativity in doctrine and in determination of hypotheti-
cal instances upon which doctrine must operate. But these great
jurists rarely apply their metaphors to real cases. This bare recital
of elementary truths suggests a need for a further exercise of imagi-
nation in order to perceive the intellectual costs of keeping the realm
of fact at its present nicely calibrated level of indeterminacy.
The operators of the legal system know whimsy when they see it,
and they know it when they perpetrate it. But they are relatively
powerless to do anything about it, even at a level of subjective
freedom where the power to determine facts is transformed into
power to do justice by wielding the armaments of discretion. Human
values affect and distort perception even in the simplest cases. Fur-
thermore, in the complex problems posed by legally framed conten-
tions of fact, there is believed to be a transcendent value in the
"wisdom" and the "experience" brought to the task of factfinding
by seasoned and anointed judges, or by neighbors or others ap-
pointed to the jury. A consensual bias sheds a desired light upon
forensic claims of facts, thereby "enlightening" the process, and
consequently entitling reviewers to scan cold records in a "favorable
light."
The confidence with which juristic theorists hold such opinions of
the epistemology of their craft is itself rather mysterious. The legal
system is perhaps a little too naive in its acceptance of the dark side
of deliberation. A resurgence of philosophic idealism which accounts
for the destruction of the sturdy "enlightenment" version of an
objective reality is accompanied, in modern thought, by a sense of
liberation. The inevitable bias of subjectivity is celebrated as a
virtue, in contrast to previous ages which sought valiantly, in the
name of science and in the hope of community, to create an endur-
ing physical and social order that could be the subject of intelligible
communication within and between cultures, and over long pas-
sages of time. Such subjective "freedom" is the enemy of the objec-
tivity which animated the framers of our constitution, and the for-
mulators of the Newtonian universe contemporaneously described
in its legal manifestations by Blackstone. 2
There is no profit to be gained in idle lamentations over the loss
of enlightened innocence, or the corrupting sophistication of mod-
ernism. This essay nevertheless seeks to derive a lesson from inspec-
tion of the elementary categories of legal thought: those words
which are still used unthinkingly, and the formulae of reasoning
2. See D. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW (1941).
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that have an ancestry going back through English usages long pre-
ceding the 18th century. The fundamental legal categories still em-
body the superseded premises of older modes of thought. The cate-
gories used in contemporary legal discourse imply connections that
seem necessary, but their implications escape analysis. The intelli-
gibility of the modern world depends upon crumbling structures of
words and edicts. Perhaps the sturdiest of these ancient doctrines
is embodied in the word "theory," the doctrine that impartial ob-
servers of a scene, or a process, can compare their perspectives and
use their differences to gain a truer understanding of their observa-
tions. Subjective vision as the basis of theory is also a metaphor for
rationality, because vision is not possible in the steady, complete
light of mystic understanding. The practical consequences of an
acceptance of these terms is best understood by seeing how the
language of law is deployed to preserve and enshrine the mystery of
subjectivity.
The effort to see contingency in what is defined as "obvious"
depends upon a system of contrasts all its own. Clarification could
not be attempted if there were not resources available within the
realm of practical contemporary law, as well as modern versions of
epistemic doctrines which could be used to "posit a model" of a
newer and more surprising kind. The trap that must be avoided in
modelpositing is the tendency to conceive the model as a visible
object. The process of deliberation was once modeled as an algo-
rithm for the conversion of perception into speech; now one needs a
model to serve as an emblem for what is meant by "process" itself.
The legal system could attempt the standardization of the values
applied in constituting facts inferred from records constructed in
the highly artificial but worthy process of trial.3 This is the doctrine
which provides the following remarks with a perspective from which
the "obvious" can appear to be puzzling and problematical. This
standpoint, adopted for the discussion of deliberative rationality,
dictates the method, which is verbal analysis, oriented to represent-
ative specimens of contemporary American legal doctrine in the
field of civil procedure. The portions of law's seamless web empha-
sized herein all relate to the central mystery of the fact/law distinc-
tion, as well as the crucial intersections between language and
thought, where doctrine is manifestly helpless to deal with dissen-
sus., The legal concept of doubt and uncertainty is the chosen sub-
3. The approach followed here is one suggested, if not mandated, by contemporary ethical
theory. It will be assumed that the process of factfinding is a normative method of' seeing-
things-as-they-are. Norms are not in the nature of genetic endowments, but are chosen.
4. For a stimulating contemporary example see R.M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY
(1976).
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ject matter. We ask how the legal order deals with chaos, and we
ourselves are therefore immediately plunged into doubt and confu-
sion. The following account of deliberative rationality will serve as
a compass, and will be constructed from bits and pieces of contem-
porary ethical and epistemological doctrine, and by a tiresome in-
sistence that the law's concern is to treat similar cases alike. Like
the spoke of a turning wheel, the ensuing linguistic ruminations
should describe an area circular in shape and logic, within which
the mystery we seek to fathom is played out. This examination of
the deliberative process is marked by the pervasive doubt which
is the hallmark of modern thought: the doubt that law is still able
to recognize likenesses between cases, much less the likeness be-
tween cases and true accounts of past transactions or occurrences.5
This article may be summarized as an inquiry that unfolds along
the following lines: A brief recapitulation is provided of well-settled
rules and rationales that account for the special place of factfinding
in our adversary process. Particular attention is given to the central
importance of the law/fact distinction as the governing concept in
legal ideology. This ideology has established strong barriers to feed-
back or, indeed, to any form of response to the exterior criticism that
is often justifiably leveled at legal factfinding6
After exploring the inconveniences and outright dishonesties that
flow from the present structure of legal thought (with its secret love
of oracles), a new and philosophically more subtle epistemology is
described, and its doctrinal implications are explored.7 An analytic
version of knowledge is applied to purely legal concerns by means
of a nontechnical, historically oriented proposition: that the legal
community participates (with dim awareness) in general changes
which have been transforming our cultural situation and our ideol-
ogy. These changes have been manifested obliquely in the legal
subculture without having aroused any systematic attention. This
part of the argument invites lawyers to become self-conscious of
5. The statement of themes in these introductory remarks may not provide the reader
with sufficient thread to retrace the architecture of their variations. The structure of the
following argument is more diffuse and more organic than the sermon-form of the comment
or article that is most familiar to legal scholarship. The departures, however, seem necessary
(and illustrative) to consider a doctrine about doctrine. See T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF
GOVERNMENT (1935), analogizing legal scholarship to Puritan sermon forms.
6. George, King Solomon's Judgment: Expressing Principles of Discretion and Feedback
in Legal Rules and Reasoning, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1549 (1979).
7. The concise account of "knowing" in Part II is inspired by the teachings of Robert
Nozick and the writings of Nelson Goodman; professional analytic philosophers of great
stature whose insights have been but dimly perceived, and inevitably distorted in fitting them
into this essay. See N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING (1978); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1974).
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what seems most awkward and ill-fitting in the language of law.'
The practical importance of this critique is to offer a new concep-
tion of the legal factfinding process, one that exploits the logical
possibilities of our modern conception of legal language. But such a
process appears to be practically inconceivable because of the frag-
ile normative ingredients of a specifically legal notion of pure rea-.
son. The proposal of a radically different factfinding procedure
serves to assay the strength of the foundations of fundamental legal
values and the supporting concepts of practicality and of efficiency.
Finally, that which is well-settled is reexamined from a perspective
which is far different from our original standpoint. The beliefs which
are necessary for an understanding of rules such as the federal rules
of civil procedure regarding summary judgment are described.' The
insights gained from radical criticism of these beliefs are applied to
recast the concept of a "presumption." Thus, the critical method
demonstrates its pragmatic value. When the wheel of this discourse
has come full circle, hopefully the reader's thinking will have under-
gone a revolution even if nobody has committed one.
II. FINDING, GUESSING, KNOWING, BELIEVING
A. The Origins of Factual Indeterminacy in Litigation: A Survey
of the Procedural Status Quo
Judges at times complain of the standards which must be satis-
fied before they may interpose their factual judgments in dissent
from the initial fact findings. The current standards are justified in
terms of consistency, efficiency, repose, and internal bureaucratic
morale." The judicial power to interfere with factual determinations
after closure of the record must be exercised as if the reviewing judge
were a commissioner of the sanity of the factfinder who reached
intolerably "speculative" or idiosyncratic, or possibly corrupt, con-
8. In the course of the semantic discussion, the style of presentation may appear gro-
tesquely unfamiliar to lawyers; some will, however, recognize a diminutive echo of thunder-
bolts launched by such contemporary thinkers as Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. See
H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958); M. FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
(1972).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
10. See Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1950).
The existence of any doubt as to whether the trial court or this Court is the ultimate
trier of fact issues in nonjury cases is, we think, detrimental to the orderly adminis-
tration of justice, impairs the confidence of the litigants and the public in the
decisions of the district courts, and multiplies the number of appeals in such cases.
Id. at 138. In jury cases the seventh amendment imposes on the federal courts an equal or
more stringent requirement of deference to the initial trier of fact. Commentators appear to
be unanimous in the view that the present practice is completely justified by the considera-
tions of morale, repose and consistency exemplified in the quoted statement.
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clusions of fact." Each instance of such interference is a claim that
the conclusion was reached in a way that is inconsistent with univer-
sal rules of reason. The rules of procedure thus protect "invalid" but
"logical" conclusions of fact within remarkably broad limits.
It is, of course, rare for a losing litigant to succeed in an appeal
from a finding of fact on account of its irrationality; but it is very
common for appeals to take the form of such claims. 2 An appeal
based on the adequacy of the record is frivolity from an actuarial
standpoint, and it is often summarily regarded as being frivolous in
law as well." It is, however, noteworthy that vocabulary and logic
fail to furnish suitable ways for demonstrating frivolity or absurdity,
or to describe that line beyond which the factfinders become guilty
of intolerable speculation or surmise. 4
Perhaps the frequency of hopeless fact appeals is explained by
their low cost in terms of intellectual compromise as well as their
payoff in sheer delay; or it may be that the losing side is obsessed
with the appellate opportunity to question seriously the facts upon
which legal norms must operate. While the record is in the process
11. "Taken seriously, this conception [of rationality] makes of our courts lunacy com-
missions sitting in judgment upon the mental capacity of legislators and, occasionally, of
judicial brethren." THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE-SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 44 (L. Cohen
ed. 1960), cited in A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 37 (1962).
12. See Overton v. Vita-Food Corp., 210 P.2d 757 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
With rhythmic regularity it is necessary for us to say that where the findings are
attacked for insufficiency of the evidence, our power begins and ends with a deter-
mination as to whether there is any substantial evidence to support them; that we
have no power to judge of the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence,
to consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or
in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. No one seems to listen.
Id. at 759 (emphasis in original). This formulation finds parallels in other state and federal
decisions too numerous to be worth collecting.
13. The line between "rhythmic regularity" and such exasperation that the court is will-
ing to impose sanctions is not often articulated, but the dim view taken by appellate courts
of such fact appeals may be gleaned from Overton v. Vita-Food Corp., 210 P.2d 757 (Cal. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1949) and its kindred, as well as the occasional instance of sanctions imposed
for frivolity. See Oscar Gruss & Son v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 422 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir.
1970).
14. "Unfortunately there is no sure test to distinguish between the legitimate inference,
to which the party opposing the motion [for judgment n.o.v.] is entitled, and the unreasona-
ble inference, to which he is not." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 425 (2d ed. 1970).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 makes the attorney's signature on a pleading a guarantee that it is
not interposed for delay, but a frivolous appeal is not proscribed in similarly categorical
terms. Nor is the term "frivolous" defined in the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
although it states "a lawyer is not justified in asserting a position in litigation that is frivo-
lous." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4. As a disciplinary matter canon 7
also reaches the dilatory appeal only indirectly. An appeal contesting the factfinder's ration-
ality might be an instance of violating the omnibus "shalt not" of DR 7-102(A)(1) if the
lawyer is found thereby to "delay a trial, or take other action . . . when it is obvious that
such action would serve merely to harass. ... Id.
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of completion, the advocate's task is altogether different: to paint
the factual picture in extreme terms most favorable to the interest
of the client, and least favorable to that of the adversary. 6 Only on
posttrial motions or appeals can one attempt a reasoned exploration
of the middle ground where common sense would presume that the
truth is most likely to be found.
These manipulative or psychological reasons do not exhaust the
causative descriptions of present practice concerning fact appeals.
Yet they seem complete in principle, seem aimed at the right sort
of explanation. If our complacency in using present critical tools is
ever to be shaken, we must revive some ancient ways of attacking,
by reconceiving, factual disagreement as a source of frustration and
injustice. It is not cosmically ordained, after all, that an under-
standing of social phenomena must cease despite doctrinal silence
in the face of legalistic absurdity. Only the prudence of jurists
makes it seem necessary for courts to be so restricted in the course
of factfinding that they may only intimate in passing how conclu-
sions must remain undisturbed even though they are regarded as
strange, unendorseable, mysterious; in any case, deviant, or just
this side of juristic madness. 7
When a finding of fact does withstand challenge, however, the
fact of its survival is as necessary as any other. A line has been
drawn in each such case, demarcating a field of autonomy which
consists of the functional discretions vested in particular factfind-
ers. The law's empiric possibilities (on particular records) are com-
prised within the set of all of the facts which a factfinder is permit-
ted to construe free of direct supervisory interference. Is this line
continuous, traceable to origins in general principle? 8 It is not felt
to be so, even in the weak sense of tracing a discretion guided by
observance of general norms in good faith. On the contrary, the
limits of legal inference are often removed from the discourse of
16. Id. EC 7-24.
17. "The question for the appellate court under Rule 52(a) is not whether it would have
made the findings the trial court did, but whether 'on the entire evidence [it] is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
18. The language in which the freedom of factfinders is couched is extraordinarily broad.
For example, even in a criminal prosecution, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
content with the statement, "The jury, in reaching verdicts of guilty on both the substantive
and conspiracy counts, were required to choose between competing inferences of fact-this
was within their exclusive province." United States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653, 662 (2d Cir.
1965). In a civil bench trial the standard is the same, "it is for the trial court to choose from
among the competing and conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it deems most
reasonable." Rogers v. United States, 334 F.2d 931, 935 (6th Cir. 1964).
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positive law and described simply as a set of legitimate outcomes
within the trial's parameters, lying well below the threshold of a
principled normality. This is one consequence of the very high level
of abstraction at which the limits of factfinding power are currently
defined by the typical American systems of adjective law.' 9 Efforts
to articulate standards for exercising the new trial power or the set-
aside (or clearly erroneous) tests for appellate review of factfinding
have failed so far to produce a prudential logic which could be used
to deduce or demonstrate the law's version of an "empirical" error."0
Indiscriminate toleration of aberration and speculation may be
inferred from the freedom of speech which lawyers and judges use
in describing trial results when they speak "off the record." Such
toleration cannot be satisfactorily justified within the system of
official doctrine in the name of epistemic humility or of institutional
hierarchy.2' The speculative nature of factual controversy in the
legal process marks a failure of thought and language to provide the
discriminations needed to specify an adequate legal form of ration-
ality. This legal rationality should be equal to the purposes of a
19. The term "abstraction," as used here, refers only to the conclusory form of evaluation
and review standards of current rules. This form implies that the bottom line of agreement
is achieved through some systematic analysis.
20. The power to review denial of a new trial motion (on appeal from a judgment rendered
thereafter) in federal practice is very narrow. When the attack is directed to the sufficiency
of the evidence, the issue is seen as a question of fact, not of law, and the discretion of the
trial court is very broad. Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 852 (5th Cir. 1975). When
a new trial has been ordered by the trial judge, the power to review the order at all is
extremely problematic. See 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.08 [5], at 59-154 (2d ed.
1974). But in either case, the principles to be followed by the trial judge, as vestee of a
virtually unlimited discretion, have never been made more particular than the following
passage from a New York case:
[The trial judge] will not interfere just because he dislikes the verdict; or feels
quite strongly [that] he would have done something else; or even because he may
think the verdict is unjust.
The point of interference is not fixed on the caprice of judicial individualism; it
is rather arrived at by a synthesis of all the experience that the judge has had; in
the beginning as a law student, in the later controversies of law practice, in the
hearing of cases and the writing of decisions, in the sum of all that he has absorbed
in the courtroom and the library.
Mann v. Hunt, 126 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (App. Div. 1953).
21. The most telling and amusing demonstration that realism demands attention to the
nondoctrinal factors affecting decision is J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 127-58 (1930).
The generality of expressions used to state the doctrinal standards for interference with the
factfinding process are assailed from a different perspective, however, if it be noted that it is
both an invidious and an impossible task to point out cases of inconsistency under the
standards noted above. Yet the temptation is always there. Compare Lavender v. Kurn, 327
U.S. 645, 653 (1946) ("a measure of speculation and conjecture is required .... ." of the
factfinder) with Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933) (inference based on
"mere speculation" disallowed). This article is dedicated to the enunciation of principles of
a sound legal epistemology which would not permit the assumption that particular cases can
be regarded as "comparable" in such terms.
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justice which is founded, as nearly as possible, on the true history
of well-scrutinized transactions and occurrences.
Factual indeterminacy is experienced by the observers and partic-
ipants in legal controversy as a risk and as an excuse. It is widely
felt to be an existential misfortune that the gambling nature of the
processes of law result in failures of justice in isolated cases. But all
cases are isolated. Every case that is processed by the legal system
is individual, and the truth established by every case is therefore
emphatically provisional. Losers take comfort in the understanding
that legal guilt is not guilt; that judgment is cast upon appearances,
not realities.
Factual variability is thus regarded as a necessary condition for
the very existence of a legal process. If it were possible to think of
rationalizing as reason's true conscience, deviations from the truth
would not be perceived as a delusion or falsification of an underlying
physical reality (that is permanent, regular, "objective" only in a
statistical way, according to the creed of vulgar scientism). Conceiv-
ing the task of rational inquiry in different terms might lead to a
treatment of variability among constructions of the "same" (foren-
sic) facts in a more open and consistent way. It should be possible
to recast the dilemma of factual indeterminacy by adopting more
tractable categories for understanding familiar legal terms. The at-
tempt to formulate new categories should become attractive be-
cause the very shape of what is deemed necessary within the logic
of the law has undergone a cumulative and imperceptible change.
The sources of the change are manifold, but this discussion focuses
upon those introduced into the mainstream of legal thought through
a critique of the ideas of impartiality and indifference. The critical
exercise of demonstrating new or latent meanings in familiar ideals
should generate enough provocations and oblique insights to justify
the effort, and to beguile the wanderer with a sense of heightened
consciousness.
B. The Verbal Manifestation of Indeterminacy: Findings of Fact
It is easy to claim that a different body of thought inhabits the
familiar robes of legal discourse; demonstrating its anatomy is an-
other matter. The postulation of this thesis and its proof is neither
possible nor necessary for present purposes. The course of change in
lawyers' conceptions should emerge from a brief review of what law
takes for "reason." The reviewer must perforce take a standpoint for
analysis that is extrinsic to the particular forms in which adjective
law functions. However, the legal idea of "reason" and "reasonable"
embraces the rationales found in rule systems as the best examples
of the rulings of legal "reason" in contentious circumstances. The
19791
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examination of a particularly legal form of rationality thus under-
mines the boundaries of analytic jurisprudence by insisting upon
the inclusion of moral or epistemic norms that are by fiat excluded
from the fundamental categories of legal thought by many legal
philosophers.
In order to reconsider, through restatement, the body of
legal/moral doctrine which distills the common experience of consci-
entious jurists, it is desirable to admit the least controversial prem-
ises of legalism as postulates for later discourse. The most promi-
nent of these is the universal insistence of Anglo-American jurists
upon the primacy of the initial factfinder. Factual errors may be
corrected, in principle, but not through any process that resembles
relitigation. Reversal for faulty factfinding is the limited prerogative
of a reviewer; the review is directed to mistakes of logic or percep-
tion, not mistakes in judgment.
C. Inferences, Findings, Reports, Inventions: Fact Finding
Analyzed
Whether it be in the form of a general or specific verdict, or a
judicial decision, the central datum of the completed trial is a spe-
cific proposition which is commonly designated as a "finding of
fact." Just what is a "finding"? How did such an odd locution
remain so long embedded in the standard discourse about legal
controversy over facts? If mere isolation of the term does not rob it
of its familiarity for the reader, consider its etymological transfor-
mation to a more Latinate form: a finding may be said to be nothing
more nor less than an invention. Inventors, however, are free to use
whole cloth, while legal factfinders are not.
What are legal factfinders supposed to do? The answer is not
clear, nor is it located in standard jury instructions, which are much
more concerned with controlling propensities to believe than with
describing the domain in which facts are to be "found."" That
domain, to the uncritical mind, is the subset of the trial record
which is worthy of credence. So the task of the factfinder is to survey
that record, to organize it (perhaps with some insights afforded by
22. Jury instructions take the form of direct address, judge to juror. It is therefore signifi-
cant that despite their length, and often their complexity, such instructions say very little
about the propositions of fact that the juror will credit or discredit after attempting to
conform his mental processes to his understanding of the words relating to risks of nonpersua-
sion or standards of "satisfaction" (preponderance, beyond reasonable doubt, clear and con-
vincing, etc.). Assuming that the instructions are intelligible, they still deal only with doubts
or assessments of the record previously arrived at in each juror's own way. The mysterious
reluctance of judges to permit comments on the evidence and to provide models of rational
deliberation is considered more fully in Part IV. of this essay.
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argument) and then to recognize a finite entity on its surface, the
"true" and legally relevant proposition of fact that has been prop-
erly founded upon testimony or other evidence.
This found fact emerges from the contest as a concept with a clear
definition of its boundaries (provided by the formulae of the prima
facie case) but with merely provisional allegiance in the mind of the
factfinder who holds it with a more or less firm tenacity, depending
upon the force, weight, strength, or other metaphor used to describe
its impact or traces as it crosses the cloud chamber of a passive and
indifferent alertness. Adequate judicial notice has never been taken
of the problematic status of that found fact, which is the result of
conflicting oaths, claims, arguments, suppositions relating to a
truth forever hidden, forever beyond the surface of the record, and
beyond the calculations of probability. 3 Factfinding is the art of
collage, with the distinction of having lost even the surface coher-
ence of an organic whole, since the propositions catalogued in jury
instructions or other manuals of positive law are almost wholly fab-
ricated in relation to the honest reactions of witnesses of the drama
of trial.
The artificiality of the synapse linking the trial to the compilation
of its truths is not the product of any unconscious or unintended
mechanism.24 The highly formalized and often very detailed struc-
23. There are sound policy reasons for requiring proof of more than mere "background
statistics" as a basis for inferring a fact. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual
in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1329, 1349 (1971). Assuming, however, that rules
adequate to protect the public interest in full investigation and disclosure can be devised,
the rejection by Professor Tribe of a mathematical strategy of deliberation (jury instructions
teaching Bayes' Theorem) turns upon a sophisticated appreciation of the seventh amendment
and other expressions of community values that would prohibit the mandatory acceptance
of what will be termed herein the "criterial version" of the facts by the trier of facts.
The discussion between Professor Tribe and his critics of the value of Bayes' Theorem of
Probability in the process of factfinding is relevant here only in the sense that an instrumental
use may be found for the probabilistic rationality of Bayes' Theorem as a way of casting light
upon the jury's far-from-evident subjective probability assessments of the truth values of
various items of evidence. Professor Tribe seems to have shown persuasively that the secrecy
of the factfinder's probability assessments, and even the intuitive and inelegant manner of
its use of those assessments, is centrally important to the functioning of the jury as an
institution. Id. at 1358. The judge could be required to report his subjective probability
assessments on the evidence and to apply Bayes' Theorem in construction of the criterial
account of the record, as part of the law of the new trial power, without offending the
principles so ably stated by Professor Tribe. See also Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian
Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1970).
24. On the contrary, the jury or the judge is instructed beforehand how the field of
contention is to be divided and how the points of dispute are to be articulated in the after-
math. Counsel are invited to bring the generalities of purely legal norms home to the factfind-
ers through opening statements and closing arguments, relating the episodes of the trial
drama to the checklists distilled from standard manuals, or from scrutiny of the cases and
statutes that seem pertinent to the claims asserted prior to trial.
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ture of propositions which comprise the prima facie case is an arma-
ture for later reasonings and speculations of those who would chal-
lenge the basis in the record for any particular inference expressed
(implicitly or explicitly) in the verdict or the findings.
Having noted these essential features of legal empiricism, we
should be struck not so much by the image of Procrustes and his
beds, as by the refusal of the story unfolded in trial to conform to
the lines of any grid, or to have its dimensions limited by the cata-
logs found in such works as the American Law Institute Restate-
ments, or practice oriented compilations such as Proof of Facts.2 5
The duties of adjudication, as understood by the judicial profes-
sional and the attentive amateur on the jury who listens carefully
to instructions, are formulated in terms too simple to take due re-
gard of the coherence of pieces of a puzzle that fit together at last
when provisional estimates, reserved rulings, and senses of probabil-
ity, are all resolved into a common fabric synthesized from discrete
data which are presented as relevant to separately framed issues.
The job of judging is described as analytical, not synthetic, be-
cause conclusions are drawn only after resolution of issues of fact.
In principle, anyone can frame the correct conclusions; and only
considerations of efficiency limit the division of factfinding labor. It
would not offend the canons of juridical rationality to proliferate the
subdivisions of a factual controversy; nor are principles of rational-
ity at all offended by the practice in some jurisdictions of submit-
ting several interrogatories to the jury for special verdicts. If the
experiment were worthwhile, several juries could be assigned to sep-
arately resolve each issue framed in an interrogatory, and the com-
bined result should duplicate a single jury's report of findings, either
in a general verdict or in response to the same interrogatories. The
experiment is not permitted (even in speculation) however, because
it would incur great expense of spirit. The same inputs would pro-
duce distinctive outputs depending upon the factfinders' idiosyn-
crasies. Any risk of such an outcome is enough to prohibit the sug-
gested test.
For these reasons, the law's stated version of empirical rationality
is worn with the impudence of the Emperor's new clothes. Officiants
of the law share the nudist's taboo against peeking and the discom-
fort of vulnerability when winds of doctrine blow chilly. The meticu-
lous legal definitions of "issues" given to the factfinder are not
irrelevant. On the contrary, they constitute the essence of legality.
But the definitions of issues are incapable of guiding the factfinder
25. AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS ANN. is a multivolumed form book for the practitioner's use
in organizing files, depositions, trial briefs, research, and ultimately, thought.
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in performing his distinctive task. The definitions circumscribe the
law's ideal concerns, but give no useful methods for defining the
factfinder's duty to be reasonable, serious, careful, prudent, and,
above all else, accurate in reaching a valid outcome.
Duty is, of course, a moral category, and words of definition are
notoriously elusive when dealing with moral imperatives once past
the "shalt nots" which establish minimal standards of behavior."
For example, the law of torts involves, in a quasi-definitive way,
duty.Y Tort law attempts to substantiate a consensus about the
imperatives of ordinary behavior. The effort to justify the applica-
tion of the normative terms of tort law as being "legal" (in the sense
that they were discernible in advance) is a futile one. The evidence
that evolving and mutable norms are woven into the fabric of the
law concerning "duty" and "forseeable harm" is strong, but not
stronger than the evidence that similar externalities infect the au-
tonomous thought-system of legal deliberation as it ponders all con-
troversial issues, tort included.
The eclipse of formal legal definition leaves the observer with only
a vague sense of boundaries. Definition in its etymological sense
appears no longer to be possible. The erasure of "bright lines" in
order to clear the boards for the image of a balance between compet-
ing interests, or the diagram of a vector resolving clashing forces, is
one of the universal diagnostic features of the internal development
of legal doctrine in modern times. Honesty demands that theory
include among its metaphors the continuity, the delicacy, and the
sheer velleity of judgments and estimations of the complex moral
gestalts which form the subject matter of law. The result is a situa-
tional, even casuistic art of prediction. It is nearly impossible to use
prescriptive terms to establish a norm unless that norm is unobserv-
able.28
Formalistic attacks on the decline of legalism fairly aim at a
source of bewilderment, but seem naive in believing that society
might easily regain an obvious, mechanistic view of the social rela-
26. For an elaboration of this distinction in ethical theories, see Roupas, The Value of
Life, 7 PHILOSOPHY AND PuB. AFF. 154 (1978).
27. In tort, "duty" is a purely positive, extrinsic legal category, but the duty of a juror or
other sworn official is part of the legal process itself. The imprecision of even the most frankly
positive approaches to the definition of "duty" must be kept in mind when more intuitive
and private notions are invoked.
28. The writer adopts the illuminating discussion of the dichotomy between standards
and rules provided by Professor Duncan Kennedy in Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HAaV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). Compliance with legal standards must be distin-
guished from observation, which has the connotation of seeing in advance (with sufficient
particularity) what constitutes compliance with, or violation of, a stated standard. For the
rule of law ideology to remain workable, a degree of simplification is essential which enables
a runner to read its writ. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
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tions which are the law's concern. The modem lawyer tends to see
the old emblems as if the scales of justice had become so finely
calibrated that no reliable reading may be predicted. Or more
justly, as if the simple "preponderancies" based on manifest
"evidences" have been superseded by hidden variables, apart from
the familiar metaphors of volume and visible form which underlie
the language used to describe the terms and outcomes of delibera-
tion.
In this important sense then, we are obliged to report that the law
has lost its definition and is in the process of losing more of it. In
the dizzy universe of policy science, "definition" is no longer a cen-
tral concern. This fundamental truth runs across the fabric of all
legal fields, as may be seen by contrasting any set of first and second
Restatements, or by tracing the evolution of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, or the growth of the federal rules of civil procedure. Defi-
nitions which are capable of mechanistic application, and which
would satisfy the purest ideology of rule of law theorists like Hayek,
uniformly appear to be unsophisticated and unresponsive to the
demands of a very complicated social order."
We may thus conclude that the finding of a fact becomes enig-
matic through considerations of language and psychology that are
extrinsic to any particular doctrine. The fading of definition, which
results in a loss of confidence in the meaning of familiar terms, is
accompanied by appeals to increasing sophistication in applying
those terms in concrete cases. The very words of statutes and deci-
sions no longer seem to be suitable vehicles for achieving consist-
ency in result and method. There is an endemic awkwardness in
speaking of "evidence" as the basis of anything that could be "clear
and convincing"; of "proof" as some remote kindred to Euclidean
demonstration; and of "findings" as anything more than invention.
Such expressions have become the artifice remaining after erosion
of their denotations in a general revolution of thought. These expres-
sions stand in the narrow gap between the authority of tradition and
acceptance by legislative draftsmen for lack of anything better. The
terms gain legitimacy from neither draftsmen nor practitioners, and
they are rapidly losing what transparency remains to them.
29. The significance for the individual of the knowledge that certain rules will
be universally applied is that, in consequence, the different objects and forms of
action acquire for him new properties. He knows of man-made cause-and-effect
relations which he can make use of for whatever purposes he wishes. . . . Like the
laws of nature, the laws of the state provide fixed features in the environment in
which he has to move . . ..
F. HAYEK, CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 153 (1960).
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D. Conviction and Knowledge as Legal Categories: Standards of
Proof
One of the distinguishing features of the ideology of legality has
been noted with some skepticism: that is the reluctance of those who
govern the deployment of power through law to act in the absence
of a set of factual determinations which may be reported by a lay-
man or body of laymen, or which may be mysteriously arrived at
through introspective consideration of the trial experience including
argument, proof, demeanor, and one's own history. Determination
of fact is an act of definition; it is an expression of a legally ordained
system of values that demands that the reporter (or the introspec-
tor) proceed only if beliefs based on a record are held with a sense
of conviction or persuasion. Thus theology interfaces with legality:
the factfinder becomes a witness to an inner truth.
That inner truth which produces the sense of convincement is now
thoroughly secularized. The factfinder merely resorts recursively, as
instructed, to a facet of his own psychology. The moment of arrival
at the truth is not perceived as inspiration, nor as the expression of
a divine will. A solid ethical justification for the adoption of convic-
tion, persuasion, or firm and impartial belief as sufficient grounds
for acting is, however, essential to the law's pretense of justice.
Conversely, of course, the absence of sufficient psychological impe-
tus must be ethically justified as an adequate ground for refusing
to act.
Though the law's demand for a certain enlightened state of mind
in the official actor is much weaker, it resembles the concern of
philosophers who would clarify our understanding of knowledge as
the basis of science or action. There is a problematic connection
between our conscientiously formed understanding of fact, and the
reality in which fact is grounded. Far from being a merely philo-
sophical concern, this epistemic quandary epitomizes modern
thought. It generates modern confusion at the very practical level
of deciding what fodder is fit for the judicial system, and what limits
mark the boundary of human wisdom in conditions of social con-
flict. It is therefore desirable at this point to state succinctly what
the term "knowledge," in its strong sense, must posit, if it is to form
the keystone of reasoned discourse about disputed facts."'
30. The operational definition of knowledge adopted for this discussion is a distillation
from a seminar critique of E. GETTIER, IS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF KNOWLEDGE? ANALYSIS (1963)
in Professor Robert Nozick's graduate philosophy seminar at Harvard University, Spring
1976. See also Goodman, A Causal Theory of Knowing, 64 J. OF PHILOSOPHY 357-72 (1967);
Sheffler, On Justification and Commitment, 51 J. OF PHILOSOPHY, 180-90 (1954). The present
account is an adaptation of highly technical arguments, and no inaccuracies should be as-
cribed to the authorities cited.
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"Knowledge" is a state of mind with respect to external facts. It
may very well be unattainable if it is taken to include certainty, and
if the certainty of correspondence between the state of mind and the
facts can never be perfectly verified by other minds.3 ' The law is not
so ambitious as to seek certainty nor even knowledge in the sense
in which science constitutes a body of knowledge. Yet law (for all
its practicality) is as dependent as science upon the hypothetical
(normative) formulation of what must constitute "knowledge." To
illustrate this dependency, the meaning of "knowledge" will now be
expanded and restated in a prescriptive way, as if a legislature had
commissioned some think-tank to draft an operative definition for
the purpose of deriving from it an element of legal discourse herein
called scienter +.32
KNOWLEDGE
P is any proposition
S is any subject (knower)
1. P is true
2. S believes P
3. if P were false, then S would not believe P
4. if P were true, then S would believe P
5. if S were to believe -P were true, then -P would be true
6. if S were to believe P, then P would be true
The first two elements of the definition express the commonly
held correspondence theory of knowledge, and they may be said to
exhaust the subject for the usual purposes of nontechnical discus-
sion, in law and elsewhere. The remaining elements are nevertheless
required in order to deal with various objections found in the fields
of science, law, and philosophy. The third and fourth elements of
the definition specify that S must have reliable ways of arriving at
some belief concerning P. The question is left open as to whether
direct perception is reliable, not to mention all other specialized
methods of arriving at a belief, such as trials, intuitions, and reason-
ings. These two postulates, however, amount to a claim that some-
thing is inherent in the truth-value of P which makes P open to the
discovery of any S.33
31. E. GETTIER, supra note 30 at 121-23.
32. Scienter is an adverbial form predicated of legally significant acts. This discussion is
limited to the highly significant act of making sense of disputed claims of fact. Like the
factfinder who is puzzled by the task of having to find mental facts like scienter, we must
determine what is meant by the report of a factfinder that a fact has been "found" in the
special legal sense that it is "known" or believed strongly enough to be adopted as true.
Scienter + signifies the conditions under which we may claim to know that a factfinder is
properly "knowledgeable" of ultimate facts which he has found to be true.
33. In a similar way, the first postulate appeals to an intuitive belief that there could be
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The last two elements of the definition may appear both paradox-
ical and redundant. They seem to reverse a chain of causality run-
ning from inherent ("objective") truth values in the proposition to
the mind of the knower, and to subordinate factuality to a deeply
counterintuitive kind of subjective idealism. In fairness, let it be
noted that no naive claim is made such as, "Thinking P is so can
make it so." The form of the last four postulates of knowledge is that
of a logical counterfactual; in legal imagination, they are the very
familiar kind of statement known as a hypothetical. Their contin-
gent and subjunctive form of expression is necessary in order to
maintain a scrupulously agnostic attitude about what S does in fact
believe, and about the objective truth or falsity of P. A stipulation
requiring mutuality of causation is included in the doctrine of
knowledge to illustrate the possibility upon which we depend for
establishing all notions of factuality. For if there were a world in
which some fact could be established with certainty in some mind,
then the arguments should be equally sound that the truth of the
belief, as much as the truth of the facts believed, guarantee that
such a circumstance is an authentic example of "knowledge." In-
deed, these arguments are but two sides of the same coin.
In the hands of logicians, the counterfactual form of the defining
axioms will allow some useful discriminations to be made among
contingent events. These elements may be used, for example, to
show the logical fallacy of claims to have retrodicted a random
event.34 Finally, the inclusion of the last propositions presents a
point for comparison to the legal form of counterfactual: the propo-
sition which is simply taken to be true because it is uncontested, but
not extrinsically validated. The law abounds in contingently true
propositions (e.g., presumptions, stipulations). Their grounding in
reality, rather than in hypotheses, is grist for the legal mills of
doctrine, which most pressingly requires attention.
What is distinctively modern in the formulation of knowledge
proposed for our adoption? What is its bearing on jurisprudence?
Why is there a need for the causality which is implicit in its traffic
between mental and physical phenomena?
Two of these questions are merely aspects of a single issue: the
an observer other than S to verify the conjunction of the mental state and the physical facts.
34. S cannot claim to know P under the definitions given, if in truth P occurred randomly,
and S merely knows P at this particular time. As to this random event, it is not possible to
say that under all known conditions either P or -P is the case, or what will follow from what
is known. Whatever S says concerning random P will, therefore, not be related causally to
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of P. It will be a gamble until the random event has or has
not occurred, in which case the knowledge of S no longer concerns a random event but a past
fact.
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modernity of the foregoing restatement consists in its arrangement
of its constituent terms, opening them to endless refinement and
redefinition, on the one hand, and in the insistence upon the claim
(never doubted until stated) that evidence works, on the other. This
generalized formulation of knowledge claims merely that the "real"
world is somehow accessible to the mortal minds passing through
it. The epistemic vocabulary of law, however, with its dependence
on evidence, retains more than a vestige of the preeminence once
accorded to visible perception of appearances as the paradigmatic
form of this accessibility.35 Upon reflection, no modern mind, even
a lawyer's, would unhesitatingly subscribe to the notion that the
knowable world is altogether visible. But lawyers continue to disre-
gard the consequences which follow from a realization that evidence
is neither self-revealing nor self-validating. The law has no suitable
apparatus for making sense of the modern, post-Kantian judgment
that the mind of the knower constitutes what is known. Everyone
depends upon the conventions of language and perception to make
objects out of the sensorium of raw experience. Law continually
refers to common sense and rejoices in it, but it is usually unable
or unwilling to articulate the logical and conventional priorities
which constitute common sense.
A definition of knowledge using hypothetical propositions and
elements of causality may, however, provide a tool for the formula-
tion of a written constitution of objectivity as a tool of communal
understanding.3 The possibility of such a formulation arises from
35. If we disregard illusions and all other known impediments to clear perception, we
might hope to isolate an adequate conception of the "open and notorious, plain and obvious"
item of evidence. The imaginative possibility of beginning from a shared viewpoint, looking
upon a common scene, however, is the very threshold where philosophy stumbles into its
myriad schools and wonderlands, instead of offering the benefit of its superior refinement and
sophistication to the baffled jurist. Neither the practical factfinder nor the purest speculator
has so far managed to articulate good reasons for the law's continuing dependence upon what
seems, unscientifically, to be the case.
But is sensory experience fixed and neutral? Are theories simply man-made
interpretations of given data? The epistemological viewoint that has most often
guided Western philosophy for three centuries dictates an immediate and unequiv-
ocal, Yes! In the absence of a developed alternative, I find it impossible to relin-
quish entirely that viewpoint. Yet it no longer functions effectively, and the at-
tempts to make it do so through the introduction of a neutral language of observa-
tions now seem to me hopeless.
T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS 126 (2d ed. 1962).
36. A complete analysis of objectivity is beyond the scope of the present paper, but it is
hoped that this exercise will lead to a clarification of the meanings of objectivity, and distin-
guish those meanings from mere diligence, honesty, or moral indifference. These qualities of
character which are essential in order to minimize the distortions born of empathy or antipa-
thy are negative, and they set minima. The present essay attempts to go beyond them in
suggesting both the possibility and the need for a program enabling factfinders to decide how
thorough, penetrating, and shrewd a fact-judgment must be to satisfy the optimal standards
of judgment.
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the way definition, like legislation, outlaws error, as well as from the
way in which definition posits the conditions of truth. The analysis
above provides well enough for the ancient verities: that we may be
deceived in our perceptions of the visible world, and deceived in our
normative understanding of the conventions by which it is organized
and made common through language, method, and honest inten-
tions. These sources of error cannot be eliminated by any form of
words, and the recognition of this aspect of the human predicament
is the fundamental source of the conditional form in which the
meaning of "knowledge" was elaborated. The conditional formula-
tion admits the limitations of reasonable inquiry, but it manages to
rule out a residual fear that haunts reflection with a dream of solip-
sism. Practical decisionmakers must somehow banish that univer-
sally felt risk of isolation which hangs from a suspicion that even if
the facts are as we understand them to be, the coincidence between
our thoughts and reality could be mere happenstance.' The inclu-
sion of a causal element among the conditions of knowledge offers
no refutation of such speculations, but it securely places them back
in the bottle (in which your brain is floating on Alpha Centauri)
from which they were released by some evil genius at the dawn of
human self-consciousness."
What remains controversial, jolting, and distinctly modern as a
doctrine of epistemology, the notion that we must have faith in
appearances, is very familiar to legal discourse. The element of
causality in the definition of knowledge provides a common starting
point for the lawyer and the reflective lay person, in an ideal of
reciprocity: of a mysterious but causal intercourse between the
changing beliefs of those seeking knowledge, and the phenomena at
work on them as they pursue the quest.
This ability of the world to generate perceptions, and the capacity
of perceptions to constitute a common world through language and
deliberation, has, however, lost the status of an axiom for the reflec-
tive generalist as well as the legal practitioner." A common opinion
37. The deliberateness of the choice to ignore the age-old puzzle of solipsism, by ruling
out such qualms as it produces, is of central importance to an understanding of the orderly
development of rules for forensic inference. The reason for adopting such a highhanded
approach is neither a matter of experience nor of taste; but expedience, of stating conditions
which will facilitate both the formation and the statement of consensus in the most direct
manner.
38. Professor Nozick's star, bottle, and neurons have been borrowed to make the points.
R. NOZICK, supra note 7.
39. Frequently the ultimate issue is resolved as the result of drawing inferences
from the evidence received during the trial. Trust in inference is simply the belief
that if there is a firm basis for the starting point the derived judgment is acceptable.
The difference between speculation and inference lies in the substantiality of the
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of educated persons is that ambiguity can never be eliminated from
the categories of thought and expression. This truism becomes dis-
comforting, however, when one deals with a specifically legal conse-
quence of the modem predicament: the conviction that biases and
idiosyncrasies are invisible to their carriers, and that all members
of a culture carry a common parochiality which extends to the per-
ceptions and expressions constituting "factuality."
The doctrinal response given by legal ideology to the doubts
aroused by the contingencies and finitudes of the perpetual legal
inquest is simple, dismissive. Our human limitations are regrettable
but not deplorable, because experience teaches lawyers to cherish
the notion that those old Cartesian dualities between thought and
physical matter are necessary and useful to its social enterprise. 0
Law simply cannot do without a universal subject and a clear and
evident object. The values of generality and equality which per-
meate the foundations of the rule of law ethic demand that degree
of philosophical oversimplification, if not more.
Moreover, among the doubts that must occur when lawyers phi-
losophize, it is easily feared that the legal process without its
dependence on a seemingly willful superficiality would become in-
volved in a stultifying series of doubts at every level of its operation.
For example, there would be doubt in every case whether a result
follows from legal malpractice, rather than from an application of
law to the best attainable approximation of the facts. Similar
doubts may be raised concerning possible corruption of the judge,
of the jury, of the witnesses, actually an endless vista of paranoid
possibilities, defined only through the fiat of a legitimate political
structure as fantasy. 1 For legal thought, objectivity is a charac-
teristic of a hypothetical person who rides the Clapham omnibus,
and things are necessarily what they appear to be as a matter of
record. Far from being a pejorative term, superficiality is the
central, essential and most fragile aspect of every phenomenon that
may come under legal surveillance.
Contrast this robust, pragmatic empiricism of legal consciousness
evidence constituting the premise. Inductive reasoning claims the premises consti-
tute some evidence for the conclusions and in law we speak in terms of the probabil-
ity and likelihood that the premises buttress the conclusions. Few reviewing courts
report their endeavors to form conceptions of substantial evidence under Rule 52.
Wisconsin Memorial Park Co. v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 751, 752 (7th Cir. 1958).
40. For the most definitive and persuasive statement on the ineluctable subjectivity of
factfinding, see Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in
Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1966).
41. See Applegate v. Top Assocs., 425 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1970) (an elaborate conspiracy
theory, ruled insufficiently supported by the affidavits filed under FED. R. Civ. P. 56 in
opposition to motion for summary judgment).
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to the hopelessly remote grail of certainty which knowledge, as more
than "justified true belief," has placed at the end of true research.
What the law calls a "cause of action," or a prima facie case (with
its attendant proofs and presumptions), is simply a set of verbal
formulae attested to by solemn ceremonies. Because the law re-
quires real action (or its forbearance) as the outcome of all cases
under its scrutiny, the legal system must make do with all available
data, even the often meager data which survive the screening of the
rules of evidence. 2
The legal profession is, therefore, prompt to seek the public's
pardon for the law's acceptance of sketchy statements of the
grounds taken to be "logically" sufficient to form a belief in a propo-
sition as the basis for action or inaction. The practical concerns and
constant exigencies of legal affairs have come to place the law's
empiricism at one pole of a sphere enclosing our common under-
standings. This pole is best understood by its utter opposition to
"knowledge," in which S's conviction of knowing P must be so
strongly grounded that a change in the mind of S concerning the
truth of P would provide full justification for the adoption of -P in
place of the original P as best expressing common reality. At the
legal pole, no such claims are made nor dreamt of; there is only the
frail consensus of a divided judicial mind or of the jury that some-
thing (which may or may not coincide with the discrete formula-
tions of the prima facie case) "preponderates" one way or another.
The achievement of such a consensus may require agonizing argu-
ments and soulsearching; the fascination the law has for literature
on the process is a tribute to its moral complexity. Yet the ostensible
task is still a superficial one, a matter of organizing surface appear-
ances (evidences) or at most, simple physical qualities (weight, pre-
ponderancy). The preservation of the law's authority may require
that consensus among a jury be reached in secret, and that the
outcome of a judge's ponderings also be known only by the report
he is willing to offer of them. Such a report is frequently the result
of a judicial direction that the prevailing party prepare findings of
fact and conclusions of law according with a simple announcement
of the victor's name. 4
42. "The mind abhors the vacuum of uncertainty. The trial must end in a verdict, a truth-
saying. But there are many controversies where certainty about the truth is really impossible
. . . . Still the jury must reach, if possible, a 'finding' upon the 'facts.' " McCormick, What
Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury about Presumptions?, 13 WASH. L. REV. 185, 190 (1938).
43. The propriety of delegating judicial rationalization to counsel is canvassed in In re Las
Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d 1005 (1st Cir. 1970) and is the subject of a lengthy and futile battle
between trial and appellate benches in the Fifth Circuit: Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530
F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C&P
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III. CHOOSING WHAT To BELIEVE IN A UNIVERSE OF LOGICAL
POSSIBILITIES
Before undertaking further examination of the doctrinal conse-
quences of this distinctively legal episteme, somewhat more de-
tailed attention is necessary to the psychology of the legal knower.
This section is concerned, therefore, with our often unstated ideas
about recognition, conviction, resemblances, all of the interior path-
ways which are deemed rational in arriving at opinions, convictions,
moral certainties, and ineradicable doubts.
A. The Factfinder as an Investigator: the Legal Conception of the
Role
Roughly and practically, the law requires only a few forms of
introspection in the course of arriving at conclusions of fact. It is
only suggested (by such things as jury instructions) that the evi-
dence must seem to preponderate one way or another, to make a
finding eligible for adoption. This doctrine has all kinds of practical
consequences, but these do not make it "pragmatic" for all that. No
systematic effort is made to monitor the threshold of skepticism a
judge or juror brings to his task, nor to assure that the self-referent
imprecations of the standards of proof are carried out in delibera-
tion.4" The universe of legal epistemology is located apparently in
the nethermost reaches of Plato's cave, consisting as it does of noth-
ing more than some certified version of the prima facie case plus a
self-administered criterion of some degree of conviction relating to
the truth or falsity of the assertions and demonstrations claimed to
satisfy its elements. -
Depite the glaring contrast between an analytic definition of the
term "knowledge" and the warrants for practical action stated in
positive law, there remains an important resemblance between our
restatement of the conditions of knowledge, and the account of legal
factfinding restated in these pages. The philosophic definition of
knowledge is dedicated to the banishment of the solipsist, and the
norms governing legal factfinding to the elimination of the philoso-
pher whose fact-skepticism would hang all juries and paralyze all
Plastics, Inc., 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1975); Volkswagen, Inc. v. Jahre, 472 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.
1973); Louis Dreyfus & CIE. v. Panama Canal Co., 298 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1962).
44. Perhaps the art of voir dire (and its correlative institution, the peremptory challenge)
can be used to establish a base level of tolerable idiosyncrasy. But there is no system to the
practice of voir dire, and there are no rules making it available in assessing the suitability of
a judge to conduct a bench trial even though the qualities of mind required are individual
aspects which cannot be definitely and finally assayed in the process of making judicial
appointments. Nor is there any sound reason for thinking that skeptical folks are candid
enough or self-aware enough to volunteer information about their style of thought.
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action. Both accounts follow a strategy aimed at the formation of
conventionally instructed states of mind (beliefs). Each requires
belief to be related strongly enough to the evidentiary grounds on
which it must be claimed to have been formed so that the grounds
can be said to have "caused" the belief. It is the stringency of the
definition of the "causal" nexus which differentiates the two realms,
and creates a point beyond which the law's domain looks like a
privileged island of heresy."
In its present outline, perhaps the analogy between two very dif-
ferent solutions to quite distinct problems will appear too farfetched
to enter the interior realm of legal heresy (in the sense of a danger-
ously deviant doctrine). Consider, therefore, some further aspects of
the common ground occupied by the two kinds of rationality we
have been discussing. The true "knower" and the honest juror or
judge must hold some belief intransigently. There must be a sense
of conviction, so that the belief "found" (in law) or properly derived
from the data (by science), cannot be banished from the mind that
holds it without a corresponding alteration in the complete and
closed state of affairs from which the belief derives. In both cases
the closure of the field of inference is artificial and fallible; nor is it
given to human wisdom to discriminate between an experience of
false, but justified, conviction of the truth of a particular proposi-
tion, and its counterpart, the justified true belief." God, or an
equally remote "ideal observer," is needed to break the philosophi-
cal logjam while the law deals with its more frequent (and often
45. The absence of good cause for the formation of a legal belief (finding or conviction) is
stated in terms of disapproval of those propositions that are matters of "speculation" or
"conjecture." See Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 153 A.2d 477 (Pa. 1959). The court established two
criteria of rationality: (1) although the jury may draw inferences based on all the evidence
and the jurors' own knowledge and experiences, it is not permitted to reach its verdict on the
basis of speculation and conjecture; and (2) "It is the duty of [the] plaintiff to produce
substantial evidence .... " upon which the jury's conclusion may be based. Id. at 480. Since
the operative terms in such a formulation are not further refined, the process of normalizing
outcomes of the factfinding process must become objective in the limited sense that a causal
link of the kind justified by "inductive reasoning" must be observable on the face of the
record.
46. As E. GrriES, supra note 30, demonstrates, a person may happen to believe the truth,
on sufficient grounds, but for the wrong reasons. If the American embassy in Nairobi were to
cable the State Department news of the death of Idi Amin in neighboring Uganda, having
been told by spies and informants of a coup in which he was assassinated, that information
might be sufficiently warranted as factual for serious decisions to be taken in reliance thereon.
Suppose that the embassy learns a bit later that purported photographs of the dictator's body
were really those of a bodyguard, and that Amin takes the air to announce suppression of
the plot. The second transmission goes astray (perhaps through communication malfunc-
tions) and before the "erroneous" report can be corrected, Amin perishes of tertiary syphilis.
Mr. Vance's belief in the fact of his death is both true and justified, but it would be both
false and justified if reliable informants had been mistaken or tricked into believing Amin
dead.
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probable) fallibility with rituals, solemnities and collateral attacks.
Knowledge and certainty are notions which a philosopher may
attempt to attach to the state of consciousness called "honest con-
viction" through refinements in experimental method, or logic. The
jurist, however, is content to leave the derivation of that similar-
looking state of mind to intuition or an unexamined antique notion
that belief is a matter of choice among competing evidences which
become self-validating immediately upon acceptance by a faculty
of judgment."
Little more can be said of the operation of evidence upon the
minds of the legal factfinders, since there has never been a strongly
felt need for the elaboration of a distinctively legal psychology. It
may be suspected that the curious survival within legal jargon of
older forms of expression carries with it the associated trappings of
18th century faculty psychology, but a speculative approach to this
problem may prove more illuminating than an historical one. It is
proposed, therefore, to use a typical form of legal disputation to
reveal some of the axioms of contemporary legal psychology. By
proffering an heretical doctrine for serious consideration of its incon-
gruity and absurdity (when set amidst the array of our settled con-
ceptions of the possibilities and limits of legal inquiry), the coher-
ence of a system of psychological beliefs which comes naturally to
lawyers may be plausibly exhibited.
What would it mean, then, to bring the philosophical contingen-
cies of knowledge into the working practice of legal factfinding?
Most obviously, it would mean that the possibility that every
change in the factfinder's honestly held convictions is a relevant
factor in constituting the facts to be assessed according to legal
norms would be taken seriously." The juror's pretrial experience
might even be evidence, if a few reformations in the idea of what
47. See note 18 supra.
48. See, e.g., Powers v. Continental Cas. Co., 301 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1962). If a jury is told
by a plaintiff and a corroborating witness that the plaintiff lost his arm when a gun was
accidentally discharged on a fishing boat, it can hardly doubt the reality of the missing arm,
nor the cause, a shotgun wound. On this state of the evidence, plaintiff might even be entitled
to a directed verdict, as Powers argued, on appeal. But add the evidence that Powers had
recently invested his scant funds in redundant dismemberment policies and concealed this
fact from his insurers, and the case takes on an altogether different aspect.
Note, however, that a deliberate scheme of self-mutilation, even if it is "proven" by defense
evidence, will not refute the possible truth of the initial belief (when plaintiff rested). The
gun might have accidentally discharged prematurely, and Powers might have contributed an
arm to the plot when he intended only to cash in a thumb. He even may have repented
completely and really have gone fishing. There may be but one proper defense interpretation
of the evidence as a whole in a case like Powers, but either interpretation is logically legiti-
mate if the factfinder is truly free to accept any proposition that comports with inductive
logic.
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constitutes deliberation and in the methods for creating and closing
the record are allowed. Differences of opinion regarding the interpre-
tation of the record, between trial judge and jury, or between appel-
late and trial levels of the legal process may also become relevant
"evidence." The fact of difference alone might count differently
than it does, and the difference might transform our ideas about
consistency, efficiency, and repose.
Minds do change in the course of trials. An adversary trial is an
intensely dialectical process, unfolding as a drama or a series of
orders to show cause why a certain interpretation of reality or his-
tory should not be adopted. The trial is concluded with the comple-
tion of proofs, none of which are allowed to be reflexive (the address-
ee is not allowed to think that what he thinks is a datum in the
realm of proofs) and each of which is formally warranted by an
authoritative interpretation of positive law. If knowledge is contin-
gent, then the interruption of doubt and debate by the termination
of proof, and the consequent movement to argument and delibera-
tion, must seem to be an artifice whose epistemic validity is open
to serious question. Even more so, perhaps, since the factitiousness
of beliefs held only as matters of opinion has been well and deri-
sively understood since the time of Plato.
B. Deliberation, Doubt and Competencies: Controlling Caprice
The central concern of this initial critique has been to find the
proper situation within legal thought of a more universal type of
empiric doubt. Given the captiousness of human nature, there will
inevitably be doubts and disagreements beyond the boundaries of
the trial process over the existence of the legally operative facts in
dispute. When doubt is concentrated on matters of fact instead of
policy and principle, the latter provide nebulous images to guide
discussion and debate.' One such image is that of an impartial
factfinder trying to read the balancing point of a set of scales which
ranges between conclusive demonstration and the totally unproven.
Another image is that of the appellate court or other supervisor of
the readings, trying to calibrate the result, not in terms of its accu-
racy, but in light of "the record as a whole," which is almost the
broadest possible context.5
49. The absence of useful distinctions is best shown by the standards for granting a
directed verdict or for granting a new trial in federal practice. See James, Sufficiency of the
Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218 (1961).
"[Tihe differences are rather because of variations in the new trial test than because of any
variation in the directed verdict test." Id. 233-34 (footnote omitted).
50. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696 (1962) (test
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It will not do to suggest that the-stopping point must be placed
where it is in order to avoid a hall of mirrors. The scope of the
factfinder is limited intentionally, and the scope of the reviewer is
expanded deliberately so that each of these officeholders is per-
ceived as serving a different function and operating at a different
level."'
More is involved in the explanation and justification of the cur-
rent orientation of initial factfinders and their reviewers than mere
institutional concern for the values of morale, consistency, and re-
pose. The most obvious example is, perhaps, the positive charge to
the impartial initial factfinder to make discrete assessments of the
proofs offered for, and against, the elements comprising the prima
facie case.5" The trial sequence and its dialectical structure, how-
ever, require that those discrete facts, serially ordered as lists of
proofs in pretrial orders or opening statements of counsel, can be
established only provisionally, rebutted provisionally, and then re-
ported after a process of deliberation. The duty of reviewers who
look only at a record and the report of the initial factfinder is sup-
posedly the very distinct one of exploring the logical limits of infer-
ence .13
Appellate fact reviewers are invited to speculate, while the object
of their review is supposed to be the product of a mind sworn to be
stubborn and tunnel visioned. On appeal, the defender of a judg-
for judgment n.o.v.). The overall picture of appellate review resembles a baseball game in
which balls and strikes can be reversed by an umpire situated in the bleachers. To retain his
job, the second umpire will seldom exercise an independent judgment, but the crucial issue
is how he came to be placed there instead of being behind the man behind the plate.
51. [W]e [do] not sit to try cases de novo. The scope of review is limited by
the clearly erroneous rule. F.R. Civ. P. 52(a). The issue is not whether we would
have made the same findings as the District Court but whether, after reviewing the
entire evidence, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has
been made.
Hunt v. Pan Am. Energy, Inc., 540 F.2d 894, 900-01 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977).
The appropriate, orthodox analogy is to the chief of umpires, who considers seasonal con-
tract review of the man behind the plate, rather than to a checker, who provides a certain
redundancy in the system in order to assure quality control.
52. In law, as in baseball, it is expected that the evaluator of the evidence will call it as
he sees it. It would be a different game if each batter were allowed say seven pitches (exclusive
of fouls) and then the umpire would announce that the home run hit on the sixth pitch was
invalid as the batter had already earned a walk!
53. The verdict of a jury should not be lightly set aside, nor should a new trial
be lightly granted-certainly not for the mere reason that the Court may disagree
with the verdict. However . . . . [iut also must be remembered that forced or
violent inferences may not be drawn and that an inference is a permissible deduc-
tion only when it may be reached by logic or reason . ...
Cecil Corley Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819, 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1974)
(chosen as representative dictum from a representative trial bench).
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ment may rely upon suggestion and supposition concerning such
things as the witnesses' demeanor (and the factfinder's superior
perspective of it) and the sincerity and coherence of a positon taken
in a drama with many episodes.5 The reviewer's burden is said to
be limited to the logical task of finding what matters of record could,
if believed, support some disputed inference. It is implicit in this
formulation (and therefore doubtless a comfort) that the could of
counterfactual appellate discourse harbors an invitation to express
considerable skepticism about the outcome that would have been
reached by an inquirer having a different orientation to the proofs.
The aberrational factfinder must be so unreasonable as to be
committed to a "clearly erroneous" conclusion before interference
with the primary construction of the record becomes permissible
under the doctrine just examined. 55 But suppose it were possible to
make the concept of "unreason" relative along a specifically juristic
axis of plausibility. After all, the factfinder in a secular judicial
process is not allowed to find a miracle, nor permitted to suppose
that he is dreaming. Yet there is a possibility that he may say a
bubble has been burst, making a presumed fact once more contro-
versial." It is also possible that the factfinder may determine a fact
to have been overwhelmingly established by cumulative or direct
forms of valid evidence (e.g., the taped replay of Ruby shooting
Oswald) . As an aspect of subjective consciousness, the stakes con-
tended for in trial are simply labels regarding what makes common
sense.
This notion of common sense is a normative idea, predicated in
and of a social world. It provides us with a field in which stories can
be rank ordered, both as to their elements and as coherent entities
standing in a relation of relative plausibility to their immediate
audiences~5 The communal aspect of the common sense required by
54. "The authority of an appellate court, when reviewing the findings of a judge as well
as those of a jury, is circumscribed by the deference it must give to decisions of the trier of
the fact, who is usually in a superior position to appraise and weigh the evidence." Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100 (1969); Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698, 702 (1962).
56. See discussion of presumptions at text accompanying notes 101-02 infra.
57. See Greene v. Werven, 275 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1960); Snead v. New York Central R.R.,
216 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1954).
58. A distinction must be noted between variable interpretations of a set of proofs, and
what is sometimes called "circumstantial evidence," meaning indirect proofs. The idea that
proofs must be considered in the context of other associated proofs which are not in a direct
line of inference may be seen in the law of conspiracy.
All experience shows that positive proof of fraudulent acts . . . is not generally to
be expected, and it is for that reason, among others, that the law allows in such
controversies a resort to circumstances as the means of ascertaining the truth, and
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the forensic factfinding process is an unstated and intentionally
ambiguous premise, relating persuasion to a larger consensus. It
might be formulated, for example, in a statement that proper sam-
pling of the community would provide a common recapitulation
that would serve as the criterion account of the facts inferable from
some particular exemplary trial record. For any such randomly se-
lected record, the consensus might range over a series of values from
the belief that the record is merely fiction, to the firm conviction
that it is a faithful depiction of historical facts.
Legal theory finds the gestation of such a consensus a mystery.
The formation of factual beliefs is a matter of intuition, inspiration,
or even the exercise of an immeasurable faculty of judgment. The
investigation of the origins of a solemn announcement is a matter
for a sociologist, anthropologist, or psychoanalyst; anyone but a
jurist.
The premise which justifies deference to the closed door of the
jury room or the magic word "submitted" is nevertheless a legal
notion. Putting the case in terms of a hypothetical, totally repre-
sentative jury may serve to emphasize the normative element in
factual judgments, and to throw into higher relief the differences
between the law's evaluative psychology and the disciplines of other
human sciences. Moreover, the recourse to consensus as the key
element in understanding the quest for fairness is suited to the style
of legal rhetoric that is exemplified by the long and fruitless quest
by the Supreme Court for a relevant consensus in the definition of
obscenity."
When the background of assumed consensus is pulled away from
the found facts, genuine heresy can emerge as a temptation no
longer repressed by legal consciousness. If publicity, normality, and
the other ingredients of positive law are applied to the constitution
of its factual basis through the process of deliberation, then immedi-
ately the problem of factual disagreement is transformed. Positiv-
the rule of evidence is well settled that circumstances altogether inconclusive, if
separately considered, may by their number and joint operation, especially when
corroborated by moral coincidences, be sufficient to constitute conclusive proof
Wager v. Hall, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 584, 601-02 (1872).
59. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), approving jury determination of obscenity
by a jury selected from the southern district of California. "But this is not to say that a district
court would not be at liberty to admit evidence of standards existing in some place outside
of this particular district .... " Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974). A jury
may be instructed to apply community standards without definition of the relevant com-
munity. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974). But the standard can't be so observable
and uniform as to be capable of reduction to words by a legislature. Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 302 (1977).
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ism and realism cease to be dominant organizing principles for or-
dering our perceptions of legal phenomena.10 Disagreement over fac-
tual matters no longer occupies the back-channels of legal commu-
nication. Attention may now be directed to an art of criticism based
on "possible worlds." 6' The stages of this transformation in under-
standing are the familiar ones already mentioned while noting uni-
versal trends in the evolution of substantive law. Proceduralized,
the stages call for rigorous but polyvalent tests of verisimilitude in
place of univocal standards with the mechanical features of a light
switch (for example, the law of presumptions)." Issues that have
remained unresponsive to the stresses of forensic debate may yet
find words to clothe them, as we cease speaking the marketplace
lingo of "competing inferences."
The rejection of a Darwinian model of reason is a safe enough
move; it need not throw us upon the other horn of an old dilemma.
The alternative to a regime of competition and survival of the fittest
among tenable inferences is certainly not a regime which engineers
its results by prescribing preferred traits and breeding out anoma-
lous ones (e.g., through arbitrary rules of admissibility) in accord-
ance with a foreordained conception of forensic factuality. Rather,
one must seek a set of criteria for good factfinding, which admits
that trials are neither experiments nor digs among the wreckage of
the recent past. Inquiry must be directed toward the constitution
of a more humble sort of truth, one which has esthetic, ethical,
political, scientific and, quite prominently, speculative dimensions
befitting the most creative of collaborative enterprises. Thus, the
problems which take precedence when we look at the specific func-
tion of the trial should turn attention toward the methodological
puzzles of history, not to the logical confusion that must beset one
who would provide an account of the compilation of a single best
hypothesis from a collection of singular instances while calling the
exercise induction.
60. Positive law offers no useful prescriptions to remedy doubt or confusion in the forensic
perception of fact, and it is this very circumstance that has provided "realists" with oppor-
tunity for their exuberant iconoclasm, of which Jerome Frank's LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
(1930) is the finest example. However, no one has yet implemented a convincing program for
a realistic investigation of the behavioral regularities of legal functionaries as they exercise
the freedom conferred by fact indeterminacy. The fault-line that marks the schism between
realists and their adversaries is deceptive in its obscuration of the nature and status of
normative principles in the process of deliberation.
61. See N. GOODMAN; R. NOZICK, supra note 7 for exemplification of the complex argu-
ments that are made possible by a strategy of comparing this world with other possible worlds
differing from this one in incremental ways.
62. See Part V. infra.
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IV. OBJECTIVITY: MAKING, REACHING, JUMPING, CHOOSING-A
PROGRAM FOR POLICING EVALUATIONS OF PARTICULAR FACTS
A. Taboo in Present Doctrines Against Disclosure of Preferences
Among Competing Inferences
Stating norms for the regulation of implausibility requires judg-
ments of creditworthiness which can be explicitly stated only at risk
of reversal in the present system of legal doctrine, because the
source of such judgments is positively defined by law as prejudice.
Strictly speaking, whether adoption of a claim of fact is decreed
according to mathematical models of probability, 3 or is based on
personally noticed unverified universals (like the connection be-
tween sweaty palms and mendacity) 4 the formation of any disposi-
tion whatever about the character or weight of the proofs is extra-
(and therefore pre-) judicial. The offensiveness of excessive candor
is a different and graver matter than the breach of the spatial limits
set by the courtroom and its trial. To tell all, or any, of the interior
processes of evidence appraisal is embarrassing. Confessional litera-
ture is a rarity among the bench and bar, and it is marked by a
delicacy elsewhere unseen since the days of the Victorians. 5 The
course of choice among competing versions of facts supposedly runs
below the surface of thought and speech; the silent doctrine respect-
ing it is "beyond speech, beyond reach."
Nevertheless, there is an observable movement within adjective
law, as there is within the major restated or codified substantive
systems, from a presumption toward a more generalized rationale
of the controversial fact; away from the varieties of "plain error"
63. See discussion of "mathematical interpretations of the testimony," an approach that
is "often forceful and is sometimes persuasive ..... ".in Solomon Dehydrating Co. v.
Guyton, 294 F.2d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1961).
64. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933), reversing criminal conviction for
prejudicial error in commenting on the evidence.
And now I am going to tell you what I think of the defendant's testimony. You may
have noticed, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, that he wiped his hands during his
testimony. It is rather a curious thing, but that is almost always an indication of
lying. Why it should be so we don't know, but that is the fact. I think that every
single word that man said, except when he agreed with the Government's testi-
mony, was a lie.
Id. at 468.
65. Since the trial process is reserved for resolving disputes of fact, it is not surprising that
most such disputes involve conflicts between different testimony that is equally well founded.
Selecting between contradictory testimonial statements is therefore an exercise in judgment
of creditworthiness. It invokes the same kinds of totalistic appraisals of a witness' character
as does the assessment of "parent-worthiness" that courts are obliged to make when deter-
mining the best interests of a child in custody disputes. The most illuminating literature on
the factors that courts deem relevant to these tasks is found in family law cases such as
Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
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and toward a systematic treatment of abuses of an empirically dis-
covered, operative discretion to find fact. In much the same key,
there is the already noted awkwardness in keeping evidence on the
plane of a term of art, avoiding its connotations of an observable and
self-validating world, and a corresponding receptivity to discussion
of ensembles and versions." Probative value is regarded not as a
natural characteristic of discrete proofs, but as the result of complex
considerations of context, and the completion of the trial process. 7
These transformations mark a change in the categories of legal
thought at the most profound level, a revaluation of what is re-
garded as necessary rather than contingent (or positive) and thus
alterable, political and instrumental.68
A proposition of fact made particulate and discrete by the state-
ment of the prima facie case could be connected with other aspects
of that case by correspondencies apart from the traditional rules of
inference. The rules of evidence, as prescriptions for the composition
of a legally adequate record, do not assure a logically adequate case.
They do not derive from, or entail the prima facie case. The rules
apply ecumenically, and they find their rationale in a cumulative
history of passion, deception, and error. Apart from presumptions,
the general rules of evidence have little to say about the various
perspectives that common sense may assume toward a record. There
is no system for expressing the intuition that a subject's conclusions
depend on the starting place that may be randomly adopted for the
sifting of evidence. Argument is largely the art of organizing key
facts, and it derives its creativity from the range over which imagi-
nation may roam in making sense of the record.
The choices offered by the typical record do not establish a com-
pletely open market of competing inferences from which one can
pick and choose truly at random. There are only a few ways to
approach the task of organizing one's view, if one is a judge or juror
pledged to conform to the norms of prudent persons dealing with
weighty personal matters. But to date, nobody has seen fit to ex-
pand a judge's freedom in commenting upon the evidence so that
66. [W]e no more characteristically proceed by selecting certain statements as
true and then applying other criteria to choose among them than by selecting
certain statements as relevant and serviceable and then considering which among
them are true. Rather we begin by excluding statements initially regarded as either
false though perhaps otherwise right, or wrong though perhaps true, and go on from
there.
N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 121 (1978).
67. See Koffler, The Assimilation of Law and Literature: An Approach to Metanoia, H
A.L.S.A. FORUM 5 (1978).
68. See Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law, 1780-
1820, in LAW iN AMERICAN HISTORY 287 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
1979]
268 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:237
the limited options of a conforming rationality may be specified."
Even if comment is permitted, it must be practically curtailed by
the impossibility of canvassing all rationally possible combinations
and permutations open to the deliberator. The need is less for a
model of all rational alternatives than for a systematic rationale for
ranking them according to a legally objective standard, such as that
of the rationally prudent juror. 0
B. The Concept of the Criterial Reading or Criterial Findings
Lawgivers could conceivably require the transcription of trial rec-
ords into established facts "in stereo." In jury cases, judges could
be compelled to compose a central set of findings for contrast to the
implicit or explicit findings in the jury's (general or special) ver-
dict.7 Later use of these central findings could be based upon the
rejection of the jury verdict according to some objective standard of
mistrial applicable to the face of the record.7 2 Or the rulesmakers
could instead invite a posttrial reconstitution of the "criterial out-
come" on the basis of purely adversarial argument in tandem with
the closed deliberations of the judge or jury that produced the ver-
dict or findings upon which the final judgment is grounded. To do
this, the lawgivers need only say that parties may no longer specu-
late, after closing the record, regarding what is not (absolutely)
inconsistent with the proofs before the factfinder. Indeed, argu-
ments supporting posttrial motions (for judgment n.o.v. or new
trial) tend to address the court as if it already possessed such powers
of second sight. The parties in "stereo" litigation would be directed
to establish, instead, the optimal reading of the record in light of
the facts as they most likely are, rather than as shown by the crea-
tive imaginings of the most favorable hindsight, enlarged by the
availability of another opinion." The second criterial account would
be fabricated openly. Since this account would be intended to frame
69. See 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcCE 51.07, at 2532 (2d ed. 1977).
70. The prudent juror is as much a fictional creature as is the prudent man.
71. The absence (when FED. R. Civ. P. 49 is employed) of that ignorance which invites
speculation is what makes a jury's response to special interrogatories a mixed blessing. Tur-
chio v. D/S A/S Den Norske Africa, 509 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1974).
72. The most extreme form a test for mistrial might take is that of the so-called
"thirteenth juror," in which the trial judge is invited to opine that twelve other assessors of
the evidence must have indulged in speculation and conjecture in order to reach their verdict.
As this is equivalent to saying that there was only one direction for the course of deliberation
to take, an order to conduct a new trial on this basis comes very close to stating grounds for
judgment n.o.v. This argument is not intended to sponsor the "thirteenth juror" test, but to
afford a more systematized process for the disapproval of unduly biased or speculative ver-
dicts.
73. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960).
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the record rather than to supersede it, to show its completions and
its lacunae, it would be grounded largely upon ingredients of com-
mon (or daringly uncommon) experience, including collective expe-
rience with the foibles and propensities of judges and juries.
A new kind of bright line is implied by the supposition that a
different kind of factual object is available to serve as the atom of
legal discourse. It is a line drawn between content and context, in
such a way that the rules of evidence and of trial procedure serve
only to generate a finite but internally incoherent set of choices
according with universal rules of logic as to their several eligibilities
for adoption. The new line encloses this set of choices, and then
draws a circle concentric with it, enclosing the arguments, preju-
dices, deliberations, intuitions, and the bargainings of fair debate,
which project elements of the record onto a screen of presumptive
congruence with an objective reality.
If it were possible to articulate such an all-embracing view of legal
factfinding, and to do so in the form of positive rules, almost every
case would disclose an area of vagary, a space bounded on one side
by the conclusions reached and reported by the initial factfinder,
and on the other side by the standard conclusions constructed ac-
cording to a positively specified method of "objectification," with
results designated as the "criterial findings." For the purposes of
this discussion, "criterial findings" means no more than a set of
ideal findings that the judge feels a properly instructed, reasonably
conscientious jury would ordinarily make, or in the case of a bench
trial, the findings that would appear to be most solidly supported
by the face of a cold record.
The hypothesis that lawgivers could perpetrate a criterial findings
rule is a naked one, based on no claims of political expediency, and
powerfully opposed by a public interest in minimizing, rather than
manufacturing wholesale, the kinds of honest inconsistency that
justify doctrines like collateral estoppel. The suggestion that there
might be room for such a rule serves, however, to reveal the cost of
intentional superficiality in the evaluation of factfinding. This serv-
ice is accomplished by the proposal's creation of a visible, arguable
gap between actual and criterial objectifications of the same evi-
dence. In this space, it is possible for other coherent stories to
emerge, and it should be possible for the reviewer or commentator
to see more clearly what speculations are entailed by the adoption
of a particular verdict or set of findings in the first instance. These
may then be contrasted with the explicit revelation (in the criterial
version) of the presuppositions which were employed to normalize
the propositions of fact which constitute one model of objectivity.
The process of conjectural reconstruction whereby a verdict loses its
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oracular status and attains the position of one (tenable or tenuous)
outcome of a series of logically possible inferences would remain
necessary. The most favorable reconstruction, however, would no
longer be ascribed to the actual factfinder as if it were a fair account
of how the result evolved. Instead, the verdict's privileged status
would derive from, and be measured by, the extent of our institu-
tional tolerance for variation, for the improbable proposition which
is nevertheless true, for sympathies and surprises and suspicions of
fabrication-in brief, all those populistic celebrations of the folk
wisdom of the jury. This tolerance has its limits under the present
rule systems in American jurisdictions. Its limits would differ under
the criterial finding rule only in being more accurately describable
through the provision of a standardized reference point.
The jumps that make up a pattern of inferences become objects
for critical evaluation once the factfinding process is opened for
scrutiny and the deliberator is asked those guileful questions that
some legal realists claim are the true determinants of prudential
reasoning, such as: Whose side are you on? When did your sympa-
thies become engaged? How? Which witness most impressed you?
Was it the truthfulness of the testimony, or some other element of
it that caught your attention? What conjectures did you entertain
as a result of those silences of counsel where you had expected
inquiry and disclosure? What do you know about these cases in
general-their economics, their fairness, their political impact?
Who argued most effectively? Did the argument help you find logi-
cal pathways around the difficulties you saw in the proofs? Did you
ever become confused, and resolve the confusion by placing faith in
the honesty of one party, or one advocate, or the court? What opin-
ions of fact did you ascribe to such a figure? Such questions may
no longer be addressed by bugging a jury room,74 and they are not
satisfactorily answered by inferences drawn from hallway inter-
views, 75 nor by the laborious "exegesis" of answers to special inter-
rogatories." Under the suggested rule, they would never need to
be asked directly of the jurors. Only by the contrasts afforded by
the parallel set of criterial findings should we suddenly see re-
vealed the contours of the artifact produced by the jury or judge.
The "stereo" vision provided by opening a second (criterial) chan-
nel should enhance the confidence of all observers that they know
what they are doing." Everyone would have a better, although
74. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY Vii (1966).
75. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-29.
76. Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963).
77. See generally E. GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS (1974).
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still divergent, sense of the extent of unguided intuition involved
in the primary factfinder's monocular selection of rationally based
premises and inferences.
The provisional adoption of a rule dedicated to the fastening of
the internal, manufactured reality of forensically found fact to the
extrinsic truisms of common sense has one further speculative at-
traction. The resulting field of doubt might be used to provide a
positive test of what is specifically and juristically impossible. Take,
for example, the California rule that the new trial power may be
exercised only through an order with precise recitals keyed to the
record." Here is a strong indication that the need for control is
sometimes perceived as more important than the need for clear
demarcation of the sphere within which an indeterminate rational-
ity is supposed to operate. Yet the logic of the California rule and
of the present proposal for a criterial set of findings both demand,
as a suppressed major premise, that the system give positive recog-
nition to error. Error must be adopted and then coopted, by ac-
knowledging that some types of disagreement are unarbitrable. This
view of error turns upon a new set of correlative terms instead of the
present dichotomy of harmful and harmless errors. The continuum
ranges between error and mere disagreement, recognizing that past
reality is ambiguous in a fundamental way."9 The revised version
allows some kinds of (mere) disagreement to emerge strongly
enough to defeat the contrary opinion of the privileged factfinder.80
It abandons the shabby espousal by legal epistemology of the notion
that might makes right.
This form of modernism in legal thought is inconsistent, however,
with one of the moral values claimed to be at the foundation of the
rule-of-law ideology. The kind of error that must be tolerated if
distinctions are to be drawn among rationalizations of a record is
deemed by that ideology to enjoy a privileged status that is funda-
mental, antecedent to the kinds of misadventure that produce the
lore of the harmful/harmless mistake.8'
The departure from orthodoxy implicit in the "criterial findings"
approach to rationality becomes even more alarming when seen in
78. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 657 (West 1976).
79. There is only one way that events really happen and therefore happened; but the past
may be irretrievable and, therefore, if there is an insufficient preservation of its traces, it may
appear inscrutable to the present.
80. The present doctrine limits intervention rather strictly to cases of physical impossibil-
ity. See, e.g., Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1970). The suggested revision would
take account of possibilities that are not entertained in a civil forensic context. The canons
of legal proof must diverge from the law of canonization.
81. See generally R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970).
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its political aspect. The program suggested here would make the
process of inference and the dynamics of personal judgment open
and controversial. Once the mysteries hidden in the ideal of impar-
tiality and indifference are put in issue, another hall of mirrors is
revealed, an endless chain of questioning the subjectivities of the
jury, the judge, the appellate judge, and so on. The moral of this
hypothetically legislated candor is clear: we must conclude that the
sensibility required for making selective judgments in construing
the record is subjective, private, and irremediably concealed from
others, so that there can be no common sense, nor consensus, on
such matters. The factfinder is indeed an ignorant oracle, buffeted
upon a sea of doubt by the vatic blasts of the pettifogger.
But the orthodox dualistic account of legal rationality might yet
be questioned usefully through a logic based in the possible worlds
predicated by counterfactual propositions. There may be a way to
circumvent, or at least to ameliorate the radical subjectivity of
choice among competing inferences which is at the bottom of our
difficulties with the standard account of factfinding.81 It will be
recalled that the causal condition in the earlier revision of the defi-
nition of knowledge was included in part to banish solipsistic forms
of skepticism. Taking the solipsist as a limiting case, it is frequently
possible to map a finite set of possibilities for making a coherent
pattern of the trial record, with options fixed by purely logical cri-
teria, starting with the impossibility of simultaneously crediting
opposing claims of proof relating to the same statement. It is com-
monly accepted that virtually every contested matter presents at
least two versions of "the facts," whose coherency and completeness
are tested in the trial by way of motions to dismiss and for directed
verdicts, summary judgments, and kindred examinations of com-
pletion and specification. 83 What is proposed here is the exercise of
an objective judgment relating these two accounts, and intermedi-
ate ones, to a common sense of likelihood: that very sense of the
community which the jury allegedly embodies in their roles as
"peers" representing a much larger group.
82. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITIcs 76 (1975).
83. The term "completion" is intended to convey a general concept of what is meant by
the satisfaction of the burden of producing evidence, and the term "specification" is similarly
intended to encompass the test of FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e), which requires a demonstration of
issues requiring trial.
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V. TRUSTING, REFUTING, PRESUMING: CRITERIAL FINDINGS
ORIENTATION APPLIED TO PRESENT RULES
A. Deference to the Factfinder Reexamined
The implications of the proposed "stereo" approach to fact deter-
mination for the institutional forms and the procedural rules of
litigation must now be examined. The value of a principle which
claims to tether a factfinder's freedom of conjecture, 4 and to regu-
late the speculations of reviewers with the rosy monochrome of the
most favorable light, is dubious until we trace the pathways likely
to be taken by our institutions in reducing its dictates to determi-
nate forms. This section will therefore explore first the expectations
and the controls by which a system of factfinding offices is consti-
tuted in our adversary, common law tradition. Then the formalities
which determine the subject matter of trial will be examined. In
each part, attention is limited to the question of perturbation: how
would a new key to the concepts of "fact," "issue," and
"knowledge" reshape the rules and the roles of legal actors in con-
ducting civil litigation?
The seventh amendment, and various similar state provisions, are
expressions of a fundamental choice (as well, perhaps, as a mis-
placed confidence) in the matter of realizing the ideal of the
"reasonable man." The initial factfinder, whether amateur or pro-
fessional, is made responsible for his considered conclusions by
being unable to share the burden of conscience and intellect that
goes with appointment as the sole fabricator of the findings. This
hallowed institutional arrangement is rootstruck by devices like the
suggested criterial findings rule, since the likelihood of radical dis-
agreement or total inconsistency on fundamental issues of fact be-
tween the guardians of our liberty and the conformist professional
(and also, of course, between any two professional jurists) would be
very high.
What response does legal ideology provide in the event of a dead-
lock, in which the jury reports (implicitly perhaps) that a necessary
fact has been established, and the judge concludes that the contrary
is supported by overwhelmingly credible expert testimony?85 Under
current standards as exemplified by the federal rules, it may be a
close question whether a new trial should be ordered in those cir-
84. The judge's freedom to conjecture is equally threatened by the normalization of infer-
ence choosing, of course. "Given the abundant discretion of a trial judge, it is hardly possible
for an appellate court to ferret out what subjective factors, if any, entered into his rulings."
R. TRAYNOR, supra note 81, at 65.
85. See, e.g., Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1973).
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cumstances 6 But the principle is clear enough, in federal practice
anyhow, that exercise of the new trial power must never be based
on "mere disagreement," as if the judge were a "thirteenth juror."87
The virtue of the criterial finding would be its ability to objectify
the relative gullibility of judge, jury, appellate panel, and com-
munity; it would make mere disagreement saliently obvious and,
hopefully, open to principled discussion. Only in that way would the
criterial finding call for continuous, case by case examination of the
nature and extent of the trust reposed in the initial factfinder.
The concept of the criterial finding is not offered as a direct path
to the resolution of factual disputes. Its purpose is to measure the
concrete resolution of a disputed issue reached by the responsible
factfinder against an orthodox, mainstream solution. The jury can
remain free to thread the maze of legal controversy in a variety of
pathways, while the reporter of the criterial version is charged with
finding the most direct route.
Disagreements which emerge when two versions of the facts are
compared, and when argument is offered about intermediate solu-
tions are not, therefore, properly to be compared or analogized to
different calls of the same pitch. What is at stake is a range of real
historical possibilities and of objectifiable differences in the judg-
ments to be made about their relative soundness. As jurists, we need
not and should not insist upon strict conformity, within that range,
to those objective standards by which ordinary mortals express their
propensities for, and their aversions to, the risks of misjudgment in
conducting themselves through the real world. The judge is not
invited to act as a thirteenth juror, but to prognosticate the likely
predominant interpretations of this record by thirteen or more un-
blemished juries.
Our hypothetical proposal contemplates that every assessor of the
facts is looking at the same evidence under the same elaborate illu-
mination."' So the judge is on the same plane as the jury, but she is
charged with an independent mission of revealing a model delibera-
tive process and a model outcome for later comparison with the
actual outcome, and a hypothetical deliberative process. Then, if
86. Compare id. with Wylie v. Ford Motor Co., 502 F.2d 1292 (10th Cir. 1974).
87. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59. But see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th
Cir. 1941) (approving use of new trial power even if there is "substantial evidence" supporting
the jury's finding, sufficient to negate a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v.).
88. The rulings on evidence and the instructions to the jury furnish us with relatively
clear images of the way the record was constituted. In principle, every step of its fabrication
was authorized either by a specific rule of law permitting such proofs as were tendered, such
arguments as were made, such inferences as must have been drawn, or by the waiver of
objections through the acquiescence of a licensed adversary.
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the hypothesis needed to save the verdict is found to depend upon
an ordering of the world that is too strange, it may be rejected as
unreasonable quite apart from issues of logic arising from discrete
and falsely analytic consideration of the record as it bears upon
proof of individual facts. Since coincidences are an observed feature
of the real world, and since its appearances are often deceiving
(particularly in courtrooms), there will not often be occasions for
rejecting a finding or verdict on the ground that it supposes too
much, beyond the surface of the record.
When rejection of a verdict is appropriate, however, the requisite
test is a comfortable, legal one regarding the general suitability of
the version of the world constructed by the factfinder for the habita-
tion of other persons who are ostensibly similarly situated." A rejec-
tion on the ground that the verdict is too remote or fanciful, that it
constitutes a world too strange or distant, will not be voiced in terms
of proof and refutation. It will instead be seen as a case of discretion
and its abuse, of permission and its limits. The criterial finding
would not become ipso facto the best or the official resolution of the
factual dispute, but it could be referred to as a measure of the extent
to which the rejected version of the record departs in the direction
of the tooth-fairy and the confusions born of passion and prejudice.
B. Rules for Framing an Issue or Confining a Controversy
The recasting of our philosophical conception of the irrational has
so far been attempted in a legal vacuum created by the law's disin-
terest in psychology. The working assumption has been that positive
rules of adjective law which establish the terms of a factual contro-
versy requiring trial are unaffected by our ideas concerning the proc-
ess of deliberation. Procedural formalities of the most neutral, me-
chanic, and purely legal kind, however, are as vitally transformed
by the adoption of a causal theory of knowledge as are the standards
of appellate review. The law's pleading and screening mechanisms
are among the most prominent examples of the modem transforma-
tion of our cultural episteme.
The function of pleadings in federal practice (aside from the
statement of jurisdictional facts) has withered away until little is
left to inspire the artist except the hope that a superior product may
serve a useful purpose later if the doctrine of res judicata is invoked.
But what has been shorn from the initial phase of litigation, it is
89. The catchword from FED. R. Civ. P. 23 is adopted here to signify the class aspect of
individual litigations. The priniciple of legality extends not only to application of the same
norms to similar cases, but also the normalizing of empirical factors which determine the
contents of any case.
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often claimed, is only deferred until a moment of more severe truth
under federal rule of civil procedure 56, when a summary judgment
awaits the litigant whose formal responses have been no more than
sandbags piled against the tide of inevitable truth, for the purpose
of allowing additional time to remove his valuables beyond the
reach of execution. The revolution in modern procedure has been
accomplished on the premise, and with the promise, that prior to
the awful risk of trial, issues will be examined and retained to be
resolved only if there is a true controversy, and only if it concerns a
material fact.
The summary judgment rule has had a more controversial past
than the reformation of the rules on pleading, but the great proce-
dural scholars of the Second Circuit who gave us our canonical
construction of rule 56 were united in their emphasis on a funda-
mental point. That is, of course, the duty of the judge who applies
the rule to limit his inquiry to the purely legal question, whether the
parties are divided over material issues of fact.99 That formulation
adds little to the words of the rule, but it carries large implications
for our present inquiry. The meaning of issue for the purposes of the
rulesmakers, is simply a matter of logic. The issue is static, retain-
ing its character under rule 56, or at the pleading stage, or at the
appellate level. The complacency of the legal profession, derived
from its contentiousness and innocent faith in the dialectical virtue
of the adversary crucible, leads its rulesmakers to provide, for exam-
ple, that some averments may be deemed denied as a matter of mere
convenience.
In the case of rule 56, the image of the factual issue requiring trial
is not complex: it is nothing more than an averment and an actual
or constructive denial of a proposition (or series of propositions) of
fact. It will be argued in the discussion of presumptions below that
such a simplification of the concept of an issue is conscious and
intentional, and that the intent is to produce useful confusion. It
must, however, be admitted that the historical origin of what is
called the "federal rules approach" to the problem of defining con-
troversy was a pure and noble reaction to the elaborate system of
common law pleading, with its indifference to the semantic content
of the single issue it sought to frame as the crux of trial.
Just as the issue remains unsplit by the categories of rule 56, the
concept of the material fact remains largely indebted for its intelli-
gibility to the otherwise rejected intellectual galaxy of the common
law pleader. The adjective material in the rule is intended to import
90. See Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464 (2d Cir. 1946).
DETERMINACY AND DELIBERATION
a revolutionary concentration upon the importance of each disputed
fact to the specific substantive legal norms invoked by the parties.
This implicit recourse to the law/fact distinction, along with the
adjective's dependence upon older and more enduring rules of evi-
dence, provide ample indication that legal ideology uncritically ac-
cepts the idea that it is a simple matter to discover and to articulate
discrete elements of claim and denial. One needs to adopt only the
expedient of examining the postures taken by the parties: the ques-
tions they have posed to each other, and the answers they have given
each other in the discovery phase, along with the motions they have
filed, the verbal challenges and innuendos of pretrial conferences in
chambers. All phases of pretrial contention reinforce a confident
belief that nothing so defines a controversy as the opposing positions
assumed by the spokesmen for the parties.
It is unregrettably true that the point of a query, an averment, or
a denial can be inferred only through the briefing and research
firmly located on the "law" side of the law/fact distinction. The
glory, as well as the efficiency, of the adversary process consists in
its capacity to accord hostile litigants the widest imaginable free-
dom to define their own battlelines through this strangely bourgeois
form of dialectic. One consequence of this legally doctrinaire defini-
tion of free controversy is that the domain of the factual inquiry
reserved for trial is typically described in a pretrial order; or if there
is none, then in a process of retrospective inference using the elastic-
ity of federal rule of civil procedure 15 to reconstruct what issues
were (on the record) actually tried. At best, the subject matter of
the trial is a set of factual propositions which are identified in ad-
vance, and individually voted up or down, with the results inserted
into a matrix of noticed law and conceded, or previously estab-
lished, contextual fact. Only what the parties claim to be able to
prove (with some supporting exhibition of competent evidence,
under rule 56(e)) or to disprove-and only as those claims become
manifest in a diffuse series of episodes, spread over a leisurely period
of legal feints and procrastinations-in short, only an unfolding and
increasingly informal process defines the field of factual contro-
versy, and then, typically, after most of the dust has settled.
The implications of the truth or falsity of the ad hoc elements
which comprise the opposing claims, those "material issues of fact"
of rule 56, for the establishment of the parties' rights and duties are
usually considered to be matters to be sorted out after the facts are
in. Still further qualifications are needed, however, to capture the
elusive quality of legal "materiality." Because an issue's
"materiality" depends upon the hypothetical acceptance of the
truth or falsity of discrete propositions of fact which carry the issue,
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plus the hypothetical projection of the provisionally true (or false)
fact upon some screen (or model) that already displays the uncon-
tested context of the controversial issue and the other contested
facts arrayed alongside the established background (whether the
latter be provisionally or completely resolved through prior applica-
tions of the same process), it follows that all of the complexity
embodied in the syntax of the present sentence must be recapitu-
lated in the assessment of the merits of a rule 56 motion.
A remarkable feature of the materiality requirement, when it is
formulated at the level of complexity required for the accurate
statement of its meaning, is its lack of complication in practice. One
might think that the multitude of logically independent variables
which make up the usual controversy requiring trial, would make a
Herculean labor of the task of determining separately the material-
ity of each contested fact. Materiality should come and go like the
grin of the Cheshire cat, as other facts are proven, qualified, or
withdrawn, changing the contours of the context. Legalistic ideology
often dwells caressingly upon the difficulty of ordering and analyz-
ing opposing claims so that they fit the manageable grid of particu-
lars essential to the generality of rule recognition and rule applica-
tion. This insistence is central to the law's mystique. Yet the practi-
tioners on the bench and at the bar are seldom befuddled, or even
seriously detained by this kind of problem: they both follow the
repeated advice of appellate tribunals to leave the questionable
question to the jury. There is almost no such thing as a close ques-
tion of materiality.
There is an additional doctrinal reason for the highly satisfactory
performance of the elusive concept of legal materiality. It is simply
that the law has not seen a need to shuck the 18th-century meta-
physics which make our idea of what is legally material as solid and
as substantive as the rock that Dr. Johnson kicked in refuting
Bishop Berkeley." The legally material object cannot be touched;
the bonds connecting its factual and its legal aspects can be neither
severed nor described. Nonetheless, the legal intuition can seize
upon a material fact, frame it as an issue, and reserve it for ritual
resolution with an unthinking and infallible certainty. The inde-
91. After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of
Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and
that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are
satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget
the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force
against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, "I refute it thus."
J. BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON (1764), reprinted in 44 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 134 (1952) (emphasis in original).
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pendence of these judicial objects is established by their lexical
isolation.
Although elementary factual assertions and denials can be re-
duced readily to the symbolic logic of propositional calculus, confes-
sions and avoidances are a different, more complicated matter. Still
more complicated is the issue whether a proposition can be sup-
ported by sufficient proofs to overcome some threshold risk of non-
persuasion. The technique of lexical isolation is essential if these
quintessentially legal issues are to be reached at all. The process is
not at all mysterious. One simply asks whether each proposed mate-
rial issue is in the same position relative to the prima facie case as
the twopenny nail for the want of which the battle was lost. Since
the terms of a legal battle are presumed to have a regular and
gamelike structure, it should be a simple matter to decide which
facts have a direct or inferential bearing on other (ultimate) facts,
and then to compile a complete and orderly list of the proponent's
undertakings of proof. Legal arguments for the definition of the
prima facie case thus operate as a bidding system, and the wonder
of it all is only why the legal curriculum has not long since offered
courses in contract bridge among its jurisprudential studies.
Before introducing further subtleties in the meaning of legal is-
sues, it is necessary to complete this examination of the diagnostic
value of the confusions that lurk in the apparatus of rule 56. It is
well known, for example, that some issues requiring trial are in the
nature of demurrers to the evidence, challenges to the proponent of
a factual proposition to establish its prima facie proof on a record
properly constructed. Moreover, a party may determine unilaterally
what is comprised by an "issue" requiring examination under rule
56 to see if it is worthy of trial, through the formal device of entering
a denial upon the subjective supposition that even if the denied
proposition is true, it cannot be competently proven. The ethical
propriety of such a denial is supported by analogy to the criminal
defendant's plight. Being a defendant is an unchosen disadvantage
in litigation; consequently one is given a procedural right to "throw
oneself upon the law."
Note that when one looks at the right to create a factual issue as
an aspect of civil freedom, or as a safety net graciously extended to
the patient of the legal process, a disquieting puzzle concerning the
status of rule 56 is likely to ensue. How is it that the denial-as-a-
dare is deemed to result in an issue of fact? Simply because the
subject of proof and its adequacy for particular occasions is defini-
tionally regarded as part of the factual domain? Such a rationale
partially accounts for the legal system's avoidance of invitations to
articulate the normal modalities of inference, but there is a stronger
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legal warrant for the treatment of the factitious issue created by a
challenge to "prove up" as a matter for jury consideration. The
seventh amendment dictates the preservation of the jury right in
cases at law. This entails a duty in fairness to maintain as faithfully
as we may the associated Johnsonian notion of the "factual" and
the idea of the "issue" as a gage, a gauntlet, or as Desdemona's
hankie.
Within such limitations imposed by our debt to the continuity of
culture, however, it might still prove to be desirable and profitable
to devise a system of priorities and association among issues to be
considered in ruling upon motions filed under rule 56. Distinctions
could be drawn between types of fact issue, ranging from the simple
paradigm in which Plaintiff asserts A and Defendant asserts -A,
through the case in which Plaintiff asserts A and Defendant asserts
B, which is taken as being in some sense inconsistent with A, or the
case in which Defendant maintains that Plaintiff cannot support
the assertion. The avoidance of such distinctions is a cost paid with
unnecessary obscurity in the forms taken by the categories of our
discourse.
However awkward they may be made to appear by the sophistries
of our chosen mode of analysis, the old furnishings of 18th-century
thought are still comfortable enough to accommodate the excessive
proliferation of modern doctrine. This critique has so far attempted
to probe and penetrate some of the stuffing without inflicting lasting
damage to the fabric. Enough has now been said to indicate what
kinds of reorientation could be achieved within the recognizable
realm of procedural law if our aim were to make it more congruent
with modern styles of rationality. The case against a doctrine of
criterial findings, which is decisive, is far simpler than the one pre-
sented in its favor.
There is no way to legitimize the authority of differing viewpoints
in assessing the same data on the same terms. When the concept of
the criterial finding is suggested as an esthetic touchstone for judg-
ing legal consistency and inferential validity, the conclusive rebut-
tal is that the constructor of the criterial version of the facts cannot
be told anything different than was told to the initial factfinder.
Nobody can be put in any superior position vis-a-vis the record than
the initial factfinder. A parallel official therefore cannot be expected
to produce a result in any way more "respectable" in terms of the
ideal of objectivity that legalism desiderates than the one produced
by the original factfinder. The recipe for criterial findings is one of
pure inconsistency for its own sake, spiced with additional burdens
that have been proven unworkable when juries are told to specify
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their findings in the form of special verdicts,92 or when a trial bench
is admonished for failing to do its own formulations of the factual
conclusions needed to support a result. 3 The criterial findings doc-
trine is merely a utopian effort to turn subjectivity inside out, to
remove the psychological element of deliberation from the chambers
or the jury room and expose it to the ridicule which is deserved when
ignorance approaches history without method.
If biases, prejudices, and culturally preferred orientations to the
reception of testimony and other forms of forensic proof, could be
somehow normalized without legislating the transient follies of time
and place, we should gain a vast advantage in the struggle to con-
ceive and treat like cases. The conviction which presently prevails
that nothing of the sort can be done, even on a side channel, is a
confession that trying to do it would amount to the most provocative
kind of personal attack, of ad hominism. Regrettably, the incivility
surrounding factual disagreement is unavoidable, as the only way
to express disagreement within the structure of the current legal
process is to invoke the tooth-fairy either directly or with an obliq-
uity that still threatens authority and legitimacy. The alienation
resulting from living with an aleatory factfinding process is prefera-
ble to this kind of Hobbesian warfare. Yet the legal system must live
with its recognition that a side channel of factual disagreement
remains loud and active "off the record," and that it serves to exer-
cise a pervasive influence over the subordinate, interstitial rules
which attempt to guide factfinders toward legitimate outcomes.
VI. CARRYING, CONFUTING, TRANSFERRING: BURDENS AND
PRESUMPTIONS IN RELATION TO PROOF
This section seeks to apply the lessons learned in the treatment
of legal factuality as it looks at the strange clarity and pervasive
poetry of the images used by the scholars of evidence when they
speak of presumptions and burdens. Despite the hyperboles used to
exhibit the subjectivity of judgment, a trial record is not a trackless
waste, presented for exploration by the trier of fact. On the contrary,
the most barren spots in the record are apt to be posted with offi-
cially worded indications of mandatory or permitted routes toward
a "rational" conclusion. These signposts are commonly referred to
as presumptions.
92. The general verdict with answers to special interrogatories allowed under FED. R. Civ.
P. 49 is not uncommon, but it is unworkable for guiding the factfinding process in the
direction of increasing probability. See, e.g., Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108
(1963).
93. See In re Las Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d 1005 (1st Cir. 1970).
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Presumptions are most commonly justified in terms of instrumen-
tal expediency.94 The functional purpose of the presumption is to
allow a judge something to say conventionally about a basic fact,
B. In other words, a presumption is a legal recognition of the impor-
tance of the basic fact, B. Logically speaking, the law of presump-
tions is a set of rules about B. What these rules provide for is an
attitude or a status in light of B, which is to be enjoyed by a counter-
factual proposition, P.95
This discussion may seem needlessly abstract, but it will prove
useful in relating presumptions to the foregoing critique of legal
empiricism. The dominant account of what presumptions are and
how they work is to be schematically reformulated so that the offi-
cial dogma can be seen in relation to the logical and conceptual
problems discussed in the earlier sections of this essay.
It is perhaps best to begin by accepting the decisive demonstra-
tion of modern legal thought that the conclusive presumption is
nothing but a substitution of the so-called basic fact, B, for the
presumed one, P, as an element of the prima facie case. Conclusive
presumptions often do not begin their careers by announcing them-
selves as such. Most typically, the development of the substantive
law by way of conclusive presumptions starts modestly with a true
presumption, the rebuttal of which is made more and more difficult,
and finally impossible, by evidentiary obstacles placed in the path
of the naive pleader who thinks that the stakes of the game are P,
instead of B.
In orthodox theory, a true presumption is always rebuttable.
Proof of B can never entirely remove P from the arena of contro-
versy. More detail is needed, however, in showing the status of the
basic and the presumed fact. No violence is done to the rules on
presumptions by adding that the true presumption is never ana-
lytic, never even metonymic. 7 The basic fact, B, is not simply a
94. The orthodox view on presumptions in American jurisprudence comes from Thayer
and his critics, and their differences are less important for the present essay than the habits
of thought which made the formulation of any doctrine in this puzzling area possible-and
debatable-at all. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
339, 346 (1898). See also Legille v. Dann, 544 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
95. The possible truth of P does not transform its character. The most that can be said is
that P is a permitted, or sometimes a required, assumption as to its factuality.
96. The substantive character of conclusive presumptions has been recognized at least
since 1932. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 328 (1932) (presumptive language used to
impose unconditional tax on gifts made "in contemplation of death").
As a form of legal fiction, the conclusive presumption serves ideological and propagandistic
purposes in facilitating the disuse of P, but it need not be of concern to us.
97. An analytic proof is defined in mathematics and philosophy as one that is tautologous.
If B and P were related to an element of factual proof in an analytic way, they would each
be proofs of the same thing, X, and the question would be whether one was unnecessarily
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diagnostic feature of the presumed fact, P, nor a part of its essence,
nor even a representation of it directly or symbolically. B is said to
be only an associate of P, entitled to be juxtaposed with it on the
following type of rationale:98
1) B and P are encountered so often together in the standard
world of real experience that nobody could reasonably reject the
conclusion P, once satisfied of B, all other circumstances aside
(e.g., B, John Doe was born in 1880; P, John Doe is dead).
2) Proof of B should excuse its proponent from further proof of
P, either
a) completely, or
b) provisionally
because proofs of B are more accessible to the proponent, and
proofs relating to P (or -P) are more accessible to the opponent.
(e.g., B, the letter was mailed; P, the letter was received).
3) Proof of B should change the significance of P to the trier of
fact, because:
a) P should no longer be open to controversy in light of B,
or
b) P should be regarded as provisionally established in light
of B, or
c) P should be regarded as sufficiently "proven" by B, unless
(e.g., B, the defendant was standing by the distillery; P, he
had control of it).9
There is an obvious redundancy in the rationales offered under
part two and part three of this synopsis. The presumption is seen
as an instrumental rule speaking in two directions from a single
point of view, telling the disputants how to go about proving P, or
directing the trier of fact how to evaluate B. The first formulation
treats the presumption as a maxim of common sense which embod-
ies a conception of a collective, consensual inductive rationality. It
could therefore be seen as a standardized brick for inclusion in the
cumulative in comparison with the other. "
Metonymy is the figure of rhetoric in which the part stands for the whole. As the proof of
smoke may amount to a basic fact B, which supports the inference of fire, it might be said
that typically presumptions are metonymic in the sense that they codify essential or causal
associations between phenomena, allowing us to diagnose the true state of affairs, in an
inductive way. The proof of smoke, however, is not proof that this is an occasion of the usual
fire, with smoke, or instead the unusual one, just prior to flashpoint. Indian-fashion, we may
refer to "fifty smokes" meaning "fifty campfires," in which case the usage is both analytic
(smoke means fire) and metonymic (it also stands for fire). The presumption requires that a
conscious and controversial jump be made from the smoke to the fire.
98. See generally Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REv. 245
(1943).
99. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
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"criterial findings," as previously discussed. This first sort of pre-
sumption originates as a predilection, or an argument, or a com-
ment upon particular records found to be unexceptionable."0 It will
soon be suggested that the orthodox doctrine is committed to a
fundamental error, under the first rationale, regarding the demise
of John Doe. His death cannot be certified, however, until we have
further considered the usefulness of presumptions as devices for
channeling the subjectivities of deliberation, or accommodating the
erroneous propensities of forensic proof.
Scholarly discussions of presumptions and their justifications,
which take the form of doctrines about P rather than B, are of most
immediate interest here, because they are directed to the subjectiv-
ity of deliberation. In this respect, they share the status of their
conceptual relatives, those endlessly debated standards of proof, in
asking the deliberator to weigh imponderables (to see whose claim
preponderates), or to measure transparency (to see whose claim is
clear and convincing), or to guess where doubt is practically justi-
fied. The trier of fact presented with a presumption is invited, but
not compelled, to jump to P from his starting square, B. The law
provides descriptions of the possible landing points which are said
to be rigorous, mutually exclusive, and easily applied, since they are
merely psychological requirements limiting the way P is to be held
in the mind of the factfinder. Elaborating somewhat on the rules
authorized by the formalization stated above, we can describe the
field of debate in which the law of presumptions has evolved as a
rudimentary psychological system, rather than a purely logical one.
Thus-
The ALI-Thayer doctrine of presumptions accords the inference
from B to P the following status:"'
100. As Professor Morgan observed:
When the basic fact is established in an action, the existence of the presumed fact
may be inferred or deduced by the ordinary processes of reasoning. This idea is often
expressed in terms of justifiable inference or presumption of fact. It involves no rule,
either procedural or substantive, peculiar to the legal process of determining the
existence or non-existence of facts.
Morgan, supra note 98, at 246. McCormick observed:
Trial judges have to deal with controversies and with offers of proof which recur in
rather stereotyped forms. The sufficiency of a particular line of proof to go to the
jury as circumstantial evidence of a certain fact and the consequent propriety of
explaining to the jury its bearing and relevancy. . . would repeatedly be presented.
The recognition of the reasonableness of the inference crystallizes into a judicial
habit, and the inference hardens into a "presumption."
McCormick, What Shall the Judge Tell the Jury about Presumptions? 13 WASH. L. REV. 185-
86 (1938).
101. The A.L.I.-Thayer Model Code of Evidence viewpoint found its way into the Federal
Rules of Evidence only after a struggle.
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1) B is proof of P, conclusive in the absence of counter evidence
of -P.
2) Upon proof directed at demonstrating -P, the trier of fact is
permitted to hold either P or -P, and B becomes an argument for,
rather than a proof of, P. (Moreover, the argument is not conceived
as a move that preserves the jump from B to P, bridging the unfor-
tunate existence of a datum indicating -P; rather, it is aimed at
rejecting the evidence of -P because that proof is inconsistent with
the acceptance of B.)10 2
The Model Code of Evidence accepts the same rule when the record
is limited to proof of B, but when there is an attempt to show -P,
they add a nuance of great practical importance:
3) After admission of an evidence of -P, the trier of fact is
allowed to conclude that -P only in case -P is supported by stronger
proof than the inference of P that is warranted by acceptance of
B. A burden is placed on the proponent of the negative proposition,
-P, to overcome the assumed truth of P which is justified by B's
logical association with P. 1
03
The apparently identical treatment by both rules of the record in
which only B is disputed is misleading. Although both rules treat P
as conclusively established by B on a record so limited, the ALI-
Thayer rationale is that P must be taken as the only rational com-
As originally proposed by the Supreme Court, the presumptions. . . were given the
effect of placing on the opposing party the burden of establishing the nonexistence
of the presumed fact, and "[t]he so-called 'bursting bubble' theory, under which
a presumption vanishes upon the introduction of evidence which would support a
finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, even though not believed, [was]
rejected as according presumptions too 'slight and evanescent' an effect." Advisory
Committee's Note to original Rule 301. The House Committee on the Judiciary
agreed, but substituted a shift in the burden of going forward in place of a shift of
the burden of proof, and conferred evidentiary value on the presumption. H.R. Rep.
No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973) .... The Senate Committee on the
Judiciary felt, however, that "the House amendment is ill-advised ...
'Presumptions are not evidence, but ways of dealing with evidence.' . . . This
treatment requires juries to perform the task of considering 'as evidence' facts upon
which they have no direct evidence and which may confuse them in performance
of their duties." S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974) .... The
Senate Committee accordingly modified Rule 301 to its present form, and the
Conference Committee adopted the Senate version. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1974) . ...
Legille v. Dann, 544 F.2d 1, 7 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (brackets in original).
102. The presumption embodies an explicit recognition of the inference or the presump-
tive fact from the basic fact as being legitimate, but also optional with the jury or other trier
of fact.
103. See A.L.I., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 704(2) (1942). FED. R. EVID. 301 also adopts
this approach.
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pletion of a conventional, artificial, baseline world (the criterial
account again) against which it is possible to envisage reality on the
basis of any discrepant accounts that may be offered. The offer of
evidence of -P operates to "burst the bubble" and leaves the model
incomplete and entirely open with respect to P. The uniform rules,
however, take the world in which P is established by B as a persist-
ent baseline, entitled to consideration by the trier of fact even after
evidence of -P has been introduced. Such evidence does not destroy
the bridge of inference linking P with B. It simply raises a doubt
about the factfinder's standpoint: is the truth of the matter to be
ascertained by adopting the model embodied in the presumption,
or is the real world stranger than that, a universe in which both B
and -P are true? The force of the presumption is simply to define
the B/-P world as being less likely than the world in which B and P
are both true. If B is entirely creditworthy, the question remains
whether -P may coincide with B, and the uniform rules partially
close this gap by restricting the factfinder's freedom to reject P
while holding B.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence, however, also distinguish be-
tween strong and weak entailments of P by B. 104 The foregoing anal-
ysis applies only in the case of logically strong connections, like
those of probable death from a distant date of birth. The weak
presumption, in which P is adopted for a reason rooted in the practi-
calities of access to proof, and the need for fairness in recognizing
the limits of forensic inquiry (the res ipsa modality) is resolved on
the bursting bubble analogy of the ALI-Thayer model. This dichot-
omy introduces a source of confusion, as it invites endless argument
over the labeling of a particular presumption as "natural" or
"artificial," "strong" or "weak." Procedural, instrumental justifica-
tions for an inference are mixed with more substantive doctrines
about the evidence of P afforded by a fact B.
Until it is adopted on the authority of a rule expressed as a pre-
sumption, P has the status of a controversial proposition of fact that
looks like, but is very different from, the status of other issues of
fact, such as B. The acceptance of B depends on testimonial asser-
tions, documentary demonstrations, and other forms of direct proof.
John Doe's birth certificate will do. But it is the absence of a death
certificate that creates a need for P as a counterfactual statement
which is not recognized as such in the dominant forms of legal
discourse. With excessive pragmatism, the presumption is stated on
the lines of "John Doe is probably dead." The more complete, and
therefore awkward and fussy, statement of P would be that "B is
104. See UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 14.
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John Doe's death certificate," or "John Doe, dead or alive, is legally
defunct so long as our knowledge of him is limited to B."
Or still more completely: "If John Doe is 98 years old, that cir-
cumstance would be legally knowable only by proofs additional to
B. "
The rebuttal of P is not a disproof of B but the proof of a different
and more difficult case. B entitles us to imagine John Doe's corpse,
but the production of John Doe himself rules out the need for imagi-
nation in respect of P. A presumption successfully rebutted is in-
deed a burst bubble because the counterfactual plane of P's exist-
ence, its provisional truth, is no longer relevant to the factfinder's
task. But B remains as a fact respectable for whatever it is worth
as an indirect proof of P. John Doe may be an imposter; B, the birth
certificate, may be a forgery. Perhaps the most appropriate conclu-
sion is that the real John Doe is a nonagenarian, but that depends
mightily upon the nature of the proof of -P which has been offered
as rebuttal. If the match is between a birth certificate dated 1880,
and the contribution by an employer of FICA taxes in 1978 for a
person with John Doe's social security number, the inference of
Doe's death might still be defended as a mandatory interpretation
of the record.
Rebuttal evidence is logically incapable of truly meeting and de-
feating the inference that is warranted by a legal presumption, be-
cause B may coexist with either P or -P. But both P and -P cannot
be true without violating the principle of the excluded middle, so
that the choice between them is essential, and the choice of P, when
it is tolerable over evidence of -P, is entirely dependent upon B's
strength as evidence of P. The bursting of a bubble does not erase
the line running from B to P; it simply restores P to the position of
an actual fact in controversy. P is no longer a presumption, but now
is p, a proposition, which can very easily be regarded (at least by
the initial factfinder) as sufficiently proven by B for the various
practical and logical reasons outlined above.
If the draftsmen of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, or if Thayer
himself, had been more sensitive to the status of P, they might have
developed a doctrine of presumptions that is articulated solely in
terms of the variable significance of B as circumstances change. If
that approach had been taken, the presumption of law would most
likely have been restricted to the case of the unpunctured bubble:
P could never be anything more than a naked, but necessary, hy-
pothesis. The additional step in the evolution of doctrine in this
field, very ably resisted by Thayer and his followers, is a move in
an altogether different direction-the direction of the standard or
criterial version of the facts. It is a form of micro-directed verdict.
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Not exactly directed, perhaps, but at least strongly suggested.
Critics of the Uniform Rules of Evidence see its account of P as
an impertinence as well as a presumption, because the rules can
authorize an instruction to the factfinder to take a conclusion, p, as
entitled to provisional acceptance in the absence of a preponderat-
ing counterproof. 05 Under the Uniform Rules, the right to accord
such status to p, as if it remained in the realm of P, must derive
from a positive rule about the way the world appears to the blind-
folded eyes of the law. Assuming that a judgment can frequently be
made regarding how the standard world must appear in light of B
and other evidences relating to -P, the critic may justly wonder if
such a judgment can or should be arrived at in advance of concrete
cases.
Despite these reservations about the legitimacy of giving a special
recognition to B as an evidence of P, the Uniform Rules have taken
us a step closer to a law of deliberation. This law is in a primitive
state, (if we take flexible discretion to be the terminal point in the
evolution of legal doctrine) since the presumption is a mechanistic,
all-or-none rule even when it is permissive in form. The permission
is carefully phrased to allow only one state of mind with regard to
the problematic proposition, p. The reluctance of analysts to pro-
pose the next step (which would be an enlargement of the sphere of
presumptions, in general, and on an ad hoc basis) is most likely
grounded in institutional respect for the province of the jury, and a
kindred historically justified respect for the propensity of judges to
err when allowed too much leeway in commenting upon the evi-
dence. 106
Much of the opposition to the extension of judicial legislation on
the conclusory effects of any B could be obviated if it were possible
to monitor the impact of presumptive language on the factfinder. If
there were a method for ascertaining what was in fact presumed or
concluded by the factfinder-other than hypothetical reconstruc-
tion in accordance with the most favorable light test-then the
framing of presumptions could be more finely tuned to the record
as a whole. In one case, the factfinder could be compelled to find P
on the basis of B unless clear and convincing proof were offered of
-P, while in another case, the proponent of B (in lieu of an essential
P) could be exposed to a nonsuit in the event that any evidence of
-P were introduced. The difference between the cases would come
not from the theory of the cause of action, but from the statement
of a best interpretation of the significance of B in relation to the
105. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 345 at 821-26 (2d ed. 1972).
106. See, e.g., Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
DETERMINACY AND DELIBERATION
record as a whole. 0 7
The present structure of the doctrine of presumptions is an obsta-
cle to such fine discriminations. The value judgments which are
necessary in order to choose the best interpretation among several
that are adequate cannot be imposed upon the existing rules from
outside the deliberative process. The doctrine of presumptions in-
sists upon its safeguards against all positive statements of the dic-
tates of prudential rationality. It treats B and P in isolation and
maintains an implacable hostility to the notion that a partial
summary judgment or a partially directed verdict might be ration-
ally necessary sometimes to establish a P that remains hypothetical,
but also seems unavoidable in the context of other proofs (including
B of course).
These features of the rebuttable presumption in its present form
derive from a conception of the issue of fact that is as old as the
forms of action. As noted above in section IV.B, an issue of fact is
preserved for trial, and throughout the trial it is deemed to retain
its original character as a statement and its contradiction. Trial
resolves the contradiction instead of exposing claims and denials to
a changing scrutiny, an unfolding of the best glimpse possible of the
truth, so that the conviction might arrive at any moment that a
disputed fact must be regarded as true within its envelope of legal
and philosophic doubt.
If our view of proof were otherwise, we would encounter
"objective" causes of belief as well as causes of action among the
familiar features of the law. The source of these empiric causes
would be found in valid, cogent arguments about the inferences
available to the factfinder from documentary or testimonial data
revealed in trial or pretrial proceedings. The line between argument
and proof would become blurred, as would the line between com-
ment and presumption. Even more drastic than these consequences
would be the new aspect taken by the prospect of deadlock, that
spectre which has managed to generate an astounding volume of
subtle verbiage about the burdens allotted to the parties.
The burden of producing evidence (a source of many presump-
tions and of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur), the burden of going
forward, the risk of nonpersuasion, all of these are epicycles in a
system of thought which treats the problem of ignorance and specu-
lation (disingenuously) as a matter for introspection and intuitive
judgment. Without that self-directed inquiry about the extent of
107. The adoption of such a stance would render meaningless the standard talk of what
the law presumes in general terms; the law would be as flexible in its interpretation of
available data as people are.
1979]
290 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:237
satisfaction with the adequacy of a proof, we would often be forced
to confess our abject ignorance of the optimal construction to be
placed on the record. Note how venomous such a confession be-
comes when it is taken from its secure place as a justification for
placing trust in the secret wisdom of a well-instructed mind, and is
placed instead at the beginning of an argument about compliance
with those instructions. The logic of the present rules of persuasion
and proof, with its obsessive concern for ties, doubts, and deadlocks,
almost compels the conclusion that in general, there are far fewer
defense verdicts than should be expected of institutions which take
seriously the level of ignorance which is presupposed by these
rules.08 Could the factors which advantage the widow and orphan
remain hidden if the mind of the factfinder had to be made up in
public? No; but in principle the transformation of our idea of delib-
eration could still be accomplished without making the price of
honesty a systematic preference for defendants.
The most straightforward solution to the problems of excessive
logical rigor and of pro-defense bias is, however, politically bizarre.
In order to preserve the value of the "plaintiff's edge," it would be
necessary to establish this, and similar irrational elements of ortho-
dox doctrine as ingredients in the otherwise open and debatable
process of rationalizing a factual finding. The legal marketplace
presently results in many more settled than litigated cases, and the
process of adjusting a personal injury case, for example, is one which
takes account of much more than merely legal factors. Such other
elements as the experience and track record of counsel, the jury
value of particular witnesses and of the parties, and the gravity of
the injuries are "discounted" in the negotiation process. It is not
unreasonable to assume that a legislator or an administrator could
quantify the marginal value of these "jury factors." But how might
they be blended into the process of constituting a public rationaliza-
tion of particular factual conclusions? Simply by allowing the fact-
finder to adopt a pro-plaintiff finding with a farther fetch than is
allowed in finding a fact favorable to the defense? Something of this
sort is conceivable, as it is one of the most likely ways of accounting
for present outcomes which are not only tolerated, but celebrated.
The favorable light of appellate hindsight might, after all, be the
light that persuaded the jury or the trial judge to adopt an unlikely
finding in the first place.
108. "Nothing is to be gained by a detailed discussion of these cases. The discussion would
be profitless and reading it would be both profitless and wearisome." McBaine, Burden of
Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 242, 251 (1944) (referring to case law on instructions
regarding degree of belief).
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Thus, in place of the randomness (or the naughty teleology) of an
instructed oracle musing on its intuitions, we should be confronted
with rules that shade, slant, distort and explicate the propensity to
believe what it is distributively just to believe. Substantive consid-
erations and sociological experience with the jury would combine to
produce a set of rules that would wreak havoc with the present
conception of evenhanded fairness that is expressed in the assign-
ments of burdens of proof. If this cost is too high, and if the oblitera-
tion of the last bright line-between purely substantive and clearly
procedural considerations-is unwelcome, we should stop to con-
sider whether the present system of secret sympathies is any more
acceptable under the rule of law ideology than this openly partisan
alternative.
VII. CONCLUSION: LEGAL OBJECTIvrry REQUIRES OPEN DELIBERATION,
CREATIVITY AND VACILLATION
Once more, a discussion of the forms and processes of deliberation
has led to a single perspective that any reasonable mind ought to
take in evaluating the possible construals of a record. The task of
the factfinder is finite, and his defensible outcomes (when further
circumscribed by the obligation to be conscientiously critical) are
even more finite. These logical possibilities, in their finitude, are
eminently capable of arrangement according to a rank ordering gov-
erned by a legalistically objective scale of their values as approxima-
tions. The limit they approach is not one of actual, historical truth,
but of the only "truth" the legal process is able to construct-the
truth embedded in the conventional world of our scientific and so-
cial experience. That world is not ruled by statisticians; it contains
a liberal share of mysteries and peripeties, and it presents a face to
the court, counsel, and the parties that is often inscrutable.
The recognition, however, of the inscrutability and brutishness of
raw evidence is too painfully inconsistent with the majesty claimed
by magistrates, and so we are indoctrinated with the mystique of
demeanor evidence.'"1 By virtue of his wisdom and penetration, it
is claimed that the magistrate (or the juror) can see through (be-
hind, below, beyond) visible demeanor to the underlying truth of the
case. This fetish of demeanor evidence symbolizes an ineffable hid-
den truth, implicit in the interior of the record; but it certainly
should not be spoken of as true "evidence," as if demeanor were the
layman's polygraph."0 The value as evidence of demeanor and po-
109. See Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952).
110. Polygraphy is derogated in the text as a pseudoscience with full knowledge that
reputable scientists consider it an established method for determining that a subject is en-
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lygraphy is about the same as that of physiognomy and phrenology.
The survival and expansion of pseudosciences in a rational enter-
prise can be understood only in sociological terms because such
auspices are retained for reasons entirely apart from their empiric
validity. Similarly, the recurring theme of the criterial finding may
retain an office in the course of legal factfinding: the criterial ac-
count constitutes the unstated premises which guide the assessor of
any findings, in any light, upon any record.
In the foregoing reflections, the concept of the criterial finding is
discussed as if it were a procedural novelty. It is not. What has been
subsumed under this artificial device is a modeling of those purely
internal processes through which we each elaborate our own
methodology for the normative exercise of factual evaluation.
Appeals asserting factual mistake turn out to be arguments over
preferences after all. Intuitions are controlled by other intuitions,
awkwardly expressed in a code built upon a "logic" whose chief
operant term is "clearly." Perhaps the legal ideal of objectivity is
itself a matter of intuitions. We know nothing more about it than
our silent willingness to recognize what we are willing to believe,
and that willingness is founded upon a representation that appears
to be faithful to the possibilities of experience. Re-cognitions,
re-presentations: these words, like mirrors, iterate the duality
which expresses the subjectivity of the factfinder and the reality
he must examine. It seems that-judgments can be penetrating
only at the expense of remaining silent; that criticism can deal only
with doctrines, forms of words floating on the surface of the expe-
rience that is the lifeblood of the law.
How paradoxical it is for lawyers to insist that judgment is neces-
sarily subjective! Apologists of the received tradition are forced to
entertain that view only because of the greater discomfort all must
feel in asserting the contrary, that the average person can accurately
evaluate the comparative worth of particular conclusions drawn
from conflicting and ambiguous claims. Legal factfinding is not a
matter of research, not a matter of deducing the actual from the
probable, the probable from the average. Nor is the inference of a
legally effective fact a matter of induction, since the trial deals with
single instances or congeries of instances. What remains after due
account is taken of all these negativities is only an isolated position,
occupied by the factfinder, in which propositions can appear to be
gaged in deception. Accepting that there is a litmus test for exhibiting a discrepancy between
statement (testimony) and belief, we may still question whether such information should be
taken as having a bearing on the issue of credibility.
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proven or unproven in the flickering light of a precarious rationality,
illuminating the traces of history upon interested memories and
colored perceptions.
Although it is neither mathematical nor objective, the rationality
of forensic fact-determination is not so nebulous that other minds
cannot criticize and sometimes reject an interpretation of the facts
made, found or invented by an impartial judge or juror sanely con-
templating the same set of proofs, principles, and arguments. The
account of knowledge in this essay entitles lawyers to hope that we
may yet devise a principled language for the expression of disagree-
ment as something more than the deployment of power. This essay
has had to begin and end at a position that is captured in one of
the most concise "tests" to be found in any legal treatise: the test
for deciding when a finding is "clearly erroneous." As formulated in
United States v. United States Gypsum,"' the test is simply
whether the second-guesser is firmly convinced "that a mistake has
been made." A mistake is made only if the critic can say something
pertinent about its nature, size, source, and consequences. The
causal elements in our account of knowledge may supply the critic
with the conceptual tools needed to begin. On such foundations,
critical thought can possibly discover a set of fallacies, neo-
Baconian idols of the form, provided that disagreement is not
interpreted as an epithet or a claim to superior wisdom.
Law has as bountiful an experience as science or mathematics
does, with sophistries of every kind, and with specious shibboleths
erected under the influence of its ethical ideals. To describe what
constitutes prudent judgment of the facts is therefore simply a mat-
ter of discovering (for oneself) the vulnerabilities (and fallacies) that
lead to imprudent, but rarely illogical, conclusions. The skill re-
quired is not cumulative nor communicable, although close scrutiny
of reported cases provides valuable vicarious experience. The cases,
rather than the words we use to report them, are the clinic of judg-
ment. Nevertheless, the circles of abstraction which have been spun
in this discourse are not entirely futile: they enclose new areas by
obliterating familiar lines. These lines separate evidence from infer-
ence, subject from object, proof from argument, findings of fact from
conclusions of law, value from rule, law from fact. The old lines still
show through, of course. What lies above them on the palimpsest
inscribed by the evolution of legal culture and feebly transcribed in
these pages, is far from clear. The challenge of the present specula-
tions is to cultivate those fields enclosed by the old boundaries in
order to germinate new conceptions of rationalization which will
111. 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
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prove to be more conformable to a modern sense of human limita-
tion.
In closing, it must be confessed that the entire essay is only a
footnote-a very long footnote-to a single exemplary case. That
case, or a better one, can be reconstructed by trying out the ideas
encountered above on the records and opinions the reader must deal
with in trying to make sense out of trials and their outcomes.
